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Abstract. The Nakamoto longest chain protocol has served Bitcoin well in its decade long existence.
It is remarkably simple and uses only basic cryptographic primitives, but its proof-of-work framework
is energy wasting. Proof-of-stake (PoS) protocols are an energy efficient alternative; however they are
significantly complicated and promise weaker security guarantees. An effort to mimic the Nakamoto
protocol directly in the PoS setting is made in [10, 11] with security shown only for a class of purely
private attacks. In this paper we demonstrate new, and fatal, attacks on the protocols of [10,11]. This
attack motivates the design of a new family of Nakamoto-style longest chain PoS protocols, with a
formal proof of their security against all possible attacks in a general security model.
1 Introduction
Bitcoin is the original blockchain, invented by Nakamoto. The core of the protocol is a permissionless con-
sensus problem, which is solved by Nakamoto via the longest chain protocol [19]. The protocol is remarkably
simple and uses only basic cryptographic primitives (hash functions and digital signatures). The permission-
less design (robustness to Sybil attacks) of Bitcoin is achieved via a proof-of-work (PoW) mining process,
but comes at the cost of large energy consumption.
Recently proof-of-stake (PoS) protocols have emerged as an energy-efficient alternative. There are broadly
two families of PoS protocols: those derived from decades of research in Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT)
protocols and those derived inspirationally from the Nakamoto longest chain protocol. Attempts at blockchain
design via the BFT approach include Algorand [7,13] and Hotstuff [20]. The adaptation of these new protocols
into blockchains is an active area of research and engineering [4,13], with large scale permissionless deployment
as yet untested.
Motivated and inspired by the time-tested Nakamoto longest chain protocol are the PoS designs of
Snowwhite [6] and the Ouroboros family of protocols [1,2,8,15]. Both Snowwhite and the Ouroboros family
are significantly more involved than the simple Nakamoto longest chain protocol – this is because the inherent
energy efficiency of the PoS setting also enhances the space of adversarial actions and the corresponding design
of secure protocols gets more involved. A direct and clean mimicry of the Nakamoto protocol in the PoS
setting is first attempted in [11], where a family of PoS protocols called g-greedy is proposed. The authors
conduct an informal analysis of their protocols in the context of a specific attack – a Nakamoto-style private
attack – and claim security as long as enough fraction of participants follow protocol. The key issue they
focused on is the nothing-at-stake (NaS) problem in PoS protocols: unlike in PoW protocols where work
is conserved, nodes can propose for free on all the blocks in the block tree. This effect is exploited by the
adversary to grow a faster private chain than it could otherwise by proposing only on the longest chain. The
g-greedy protocol is an attempt to increase the growth rate of the honest chain to counteract the power of
the adversary: instead of proposing only on the longest chain, honest nodes propose on all chains which are
no more than g blocks shorter than the longest chain. This provides an amplification of the growth rate of
the longest chain.
In this paper (§2.1) we show that the security analysis of the g-greedy protocols of [11] even within
the context of the private NaS attack is flawed; we provide a corrected analysis. More importantly, we
demonstrate a new public-private balance attack on the g-greedy protocols that strictly dominate the private
NaS attack in terms of probability of deconfirmation being larger for every k-deep confirmation rule in the
g-greedy protocols. Our analysis shows that the balance attack is fatal to g-greedy protocols; for instance
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for g = 6 even with only a 3% stake, the adversarial action has more than 25% probability of deconfirmation
even if the honest players are using a very conservative 100-deep confirmation rule.
A recent work [10] introduces a variant of the g-greedy protocol of [11], that is termed D-distance-greedy
and which culls the honest growth to only the tip of one of the longest chains. In this paper (§2.2) we correct
the analysis of [10] even within the context of the private NaS attack. More relevantly, a balance attack
similar to the one above acting in conjunction with a private NaS attack is fatal with an adversarial stake
fraction smaller than that required for security against the private NaS attack.
These security breaches of the longest chain protocols of [10, 11] open up two directions of core interest:
is there another way to mimic the simplicity of Nakamoto longest chain protocol in PoS settings? Can a
formal security analysis under a large class of adversarial actions be successfully conducted? These are the
goals of this paper, where we show the following.
– a new family of simple longest chain PoS protocols that we call Nakamoto-PoS (§3); the fork choice rule
remains the longest chain but the randomness update in the blockchain is controlled by a parameter c;
– we provide a formal analysis (§6) of the c-Nakamoto-PoS protocol under a general security model (§4).
This nuanced analysis shows that the nothing-at-stake attacks are no deterrent to the security of the
c-Nakamoto PoS protocols as long as the adversarial stake is small enough.
Intuitively, the parameter c controls how frequently randomness is updated as the blocktree grows: random-
ness is updated once every c levels. The randomness is used to elect a leader on each block. Increasing c
reduces the amount of independent randomness across blocks and reduces the power of nothing-at-stake
attacks. We should point out that the Ouroboros family of protocols [1, 8] achieves security also by an in-
frequent update of the randomness; however, the update is much slower than what we are considering here,
at the rate of once every constant multiple of k, the security parameter. Here, we are considering c to be a
fixed parameter independent of k, and show that this is sufficient to thwart the nothing-at-stake attacks.
We guarantee the security of c-correlation Nakamoto-PoS under the formal model we define in §4. Fol-
lowing [7], we use Verifiable Random Functions (VRF) to make proposer elections unpredictable by an
adversary. This prevents the adversary from preemptively corrupting the proposers. Following [7, 8], we use
Key Evolving Signature (KES) schemes to ensure the contents of past blocks cannot be altered. Together,
these advanced cryptographic primitives enhance security of our protocol.
2 Attack on the Greedy Protocols of [10,11]
Two protocols have been proposed recently (g-greedy Protocol [11] and D-distance-greedy Protocol [10]), in
a series of attempts to improve security of PoS blockchain systems. However, the analysis only considers one
specific attack, known as private attack. In this section, we show that a different attack (known as balance
attack) is more malignant, and that rigorous analysis is needed to prove security of those protocols.
A straightforward PoS adoption of Nakamoto protocol runs as follows. Each node runs one leader election
at each time slot with a winning probability proportional to its stake. Concretely, a hash function H is
called to generate a pseudo random number hash based on three sources of randomness: the time, the
node’s secrete key, and the hash of the parent block that the newly generated block will be appended to:
hash = H(time, secret key,parentBk.hash). The node n is elected a leader if hash is smaller than a threshold
ρ × staken, that is proportional to its stake staken. Following Nakamoto’s protocol, each honest node runs
only one election, appending to the last block in the longest chain in its local view. When there is a tie, the
node has a freedom to select one block to mine on. This poses an opportunity for an adversary to attack,
by grinding on the hash of the parent block; an adversary can run multiple leader elections in a single slot,
mining on different blocks. As no significant computational resources is required, this is called the Nothing-
at-Stake (NaS) attack. In particular, this allows the adversary to rapidly grow a private block tree (which
we refer to as a private NaS tree) and take over the honest chain. It was shown in [11] that this attack is
successful if the adversary controls more than 1/(1+ e) fraction of the total stake, where e is the base of the
natural logarithm.
2.1 g-greedy Protocol [11] (F -height-greedy Protocol [10])
g-greedy Protocol. In an attempt to increase this threshold closer to 1/2, [11] proposes a family of protocols
called g-greedy, parameterized by a non-negative integer g, which is called as F -height-greedy in [10]. Under
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the g-greedy protocol, the honest nodes are prescribed to run multiple leader elections in an attempt to
outgrow the private NaS tree. In an honest node’s view, if the longest chain is at height ` blocks, then the
node mines on any block that is higher than `− g blocks (illustrated by the blocks inside the dotted box in
Figure 1). When g = ∞, each honest node works on every block, and when g = 0, the node works on all
blocks at the same height as the tip of the longest chain in the current view. Note that 0-greedy differs from
Nakamoto’s protocol, which chooses one block to mine on when there are multiple longest chains.
Fig. 1: g-greedy protocol with g = 0, 1, 2
Private Attack on g-greedy Protocol. A notorious attack in longest chain blockchain protocols is the
private attack: the adversary privately mines a chain that is longer than the longest chain in the honest
view. Roughly speaking, by the law of large numbers, adversary will fail with the private attack eventually
if the growth rate of the adversarial chain is strictly lower than the honest chain. The security guarantee for
g-greedy protocol in [11] is based on this argument.
Without loss of generality, suppose there is a single adversarial node with stake β and honest nodes
together command a stake of 1− β. This means that every mining attempt by the adversary succeeds with
probability β. In the private attack, the adversary employs NaS to grow its tree, by mining simultaneously
on all nodes, cf. Figure 2 for "before-after" snapshots when the adversary employs this attack. The growth
rate of this NaS tree is found by recursively describing the average number of nodes, x`(t) at level ` at time
t: dx`dt = βx`−1(t) for ` ≥ 1 with the boundary condition given by x0(t) = 1 (corresponding to the genesis
block). These differential equations admit a closed form solution: x`(t) =
(βt)`
`! . The expected growth rate
of the NaS tree is then the largest RNaS such that ` = RNaSβt and x`(t) decreases exponentially in t. A
direct calculation shows that RNaS = e, where e is the base of the natural logarithm (see Appendix A.1 for a
detailed proof). The authors of [11] calculate the growth rate of the NaS tree in an analogous manner (using
difference equations).
How about the expected growth rate Rg(1−β) of the honest tree under the g-greedy protocol and private
behavior by the adversary? It is clear that Rg is monotonically increasing in g. The limiting largest expected
growth rate is achieved at g = ∞, where the protocol is the same as the NaS attack. Thus the expected
growth rate Rg(1 − β) = (1 − β)e for g = ∞. One suspects that the protocol for g = 0 is similar to simply
growing only one of the longest chains. If the mining rate is slow enough (mining is considered to occur in
discrete rounds which are spaced enough apart relative to the network broadcast propagation delay; detailed
model in §4), then the expected growth rate of the honest tree (essentially a chain) is simply 1− β. This is
the expected growth rate of the honest tree with g = 0.
The expected growth rate for a general g is significantly involved. In Lemma 4.6 of [11], a heuristic
argument is conducted to estimate the expected growth rate for g = 2 to be R2(1 − β) = 2.1(1 − β). This
heuristic argument can be extended to other values of g (see Appendix A.2) as summarized in Table 4. We
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Fig. 2: Private attack on g-greedy protocol with g = 2
g 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Rg [11] 1 1.7071 2.1072 2.3428 2.4905 2.5883 2.6562 2.7051 2.7414
Rg this paper 1 1.6531 2.0447 2.2708 2.4084 2.4952 2.5472 2.5805 2.6048
βg =
Rg
e+Rg
[11] 0.2689 0.3858 0.4367 0.4629 0.4781 0.4876 0.4942 0.4988 0.5021
βg =
Rg
e+Rg
this paper 0.2689 0.3782 0.4293 0.4552 0.4698 0.4786 0.4838 0.4870 0.4893
Table 1: Expected growth rate of honest tree for g-greedy protocol under private adversarial behavior. The largest
adversarial stake that can be tolerated under the private attack is denoted by βg. The claims of [11] are corrected
and compared with our calculations.
note that R8 = 2.7414, which is at odds with the observation that Rg increases monotonically and R∞ = e.
This shows that the heuristic argument in Lemma 4.6 of [11] is flawed. It is clear that the expected growth
rate is related to the solution to the following set of recursive differential equations: dx`(t)dt = x`−1(t) for
m − g ≤ ` ≤ m and dx`(t)dt = 0 for 0 ≤ ` < m − g for some fixed m. Now Rg is the largest value of mt such
that xm(t) decreases exponentially in t. A closed form solution to Rg is challenging; although a numerical
solution is readily achieved and tabulated in Table 1.
We can make the following conclusion from Table 1: the g-greedy protocol of [11] is robust to the purely
private NaS attack as long as the adversarial stake is such that Rg(1− β) > RNaSβ = eβ. As g grows large,
this threshold on the adversarial stake approaches 12 ; for instance, for g = 5, robustness to private NaS attack
is achieved as long as the adversarial stake is less than 47.86%. The caveat is that this security statement
is misleading since only one specific attack (the private NaS attack) has been studied. A different attack
strategy could prove more malignant, as we show next.
Balance Attack on g-greedy Protocol. We describe an adversarial action that is a combination of private
and public behaviors below; we term this as a balance attack for reasons that will become obvious shortly;
this attack has some commonalities with the balance attack on the GHOST protocol in [16]. The key idea of
the balance attack is to reveal some privately mined blocks at an appropriate time to balance the length of
two longest chains each sharing a common ancestor in the distant past.
The balance attack aims to have two longest chains of equally long length, forking all the way from the
genesis block. Figure 3 depicts the balance attack in action, as it progresses over time. At any time, the
adversary will try to mine on every block including public blocks and private blocks, while honest nodes
follow g-greedy protocol. Once the adversary succeeds in creating a new block, it will first keep the block in
private as shown in step 1 and step 3 of Figure 3. Whenever the adversary owns a private chain that has
the same length as the longest public chain, it will reveal the private chain so that there will be two public
chain with the same length as shown in step 2 and step 4 of Figure 3. If the adversary can keep up this
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kind of balance attack, then it has successfully prevented any block from irreversible no matter how deep the
block is buried in the longest chain. To succeed with the balance attack, the adversary only needs to mine a
few blocks as most blocks in the two main chain may be mined by honest nodes under g-greedy protocol. A
formal pseudocode describing the balance attack algorithm is available in Appendix A.3.
Fig. 3: Snapshot of balance attack in progress on g-greedy protocol with g = 2. The goal of the adversary is to balance
the lengths of two chains each tracing the genesis block as their ancestor, consequently creating a deep fork.
The balance attack is hard to analyze theoretically, but its efficacy can be evaluated via simulations. The
depth of the longest fork and its associated cumulative probability is plotted in Figure 4 for fixed parameters
g, β. We see that in each instance, the probability of a fork of any length is larger for the balance attack
than the private NaS attack; this implies that the balance attack stochastically dominates the private attack.
For example, when g = 2, β = 0.38, the adversary is able to cause a fork from genesis, which is longer than
100 blocks, with a probability around 20%, while the private attack can only achieve it with probability less
than 0.1%. In this instance, the balance attack is significantly more powerful than the private attack.
Fig. 4: Comparison of CDF of the longest fork from genesis caused by private attack and balance attack for various
pairs of (g, β). The balance attack is a stochastically dominating strategy for g ≥ 1.
We see that virulence of the balance attack increases, dramatically, with g. In Figure 5, the blue lines plot
the largest value of β the balance attacking adversary can have while allowing a fork of a large fixed length
(50,100,200 blocks) with significantly high probability (25%, 25%, 10% respectively). The orange line plots
the corresponding largest value of β using the private NaS attack. The experiments conclusively demonstrate
the fatal nature of the balance attack as g increases: the private NaS attack gets weaker while the balance
attack gets dramatically stronger. For g = 6, the balance attack is successful in creating a very long fork
(200 blocks deep) with a high probability (10%) using only 3% of the stake.
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Fig. 5: The threshold of β to break k-common-prefix property with a certain probability actually declines as greedy
parameter g increases.
2.2 D-distance-greedy Protocol [10]
D-distance-greedy Protocol. In an attempt to make the g-greedy protocol of [11] robust against the
balance attack, recent work [10] has updated the protocol to a new variant called the D-distance-greedy
protocol described as below. The reason g-greedy protocol is so vulnerable against balance attack is that
honest nodes are mining on both sides of two, for example, chains that forked many blocks deep. This makes
it easy for the adversary to keep those chains balanced, especially when g is large. The protocol in [10] is
aimed to prevent honest nodes from mining on both chains as follows.
We first define the distance between two chains in a tree. For two chains Ca with length `a and Cb with
length `b, let C be the common prefix of Ca and Cb with length `, then the distance between Ca and Cb is
defined as max(`a − `, `b − `). D-distance-greedy protocol prescribes every honest node to first select one of
the longest chains randomly ( [10] proposes picking the earliest seen longest chain; this tie breaking could
be at least made equivalent to random time if the network delays render the blocks to be randomly arriving
at nodes; if the adversary controls the network delivery—a fairly standard assumption in security analysis—
then this random tie breaking can be readily arranged by the adversary) and attempt to extend a set of
chains in which all chains have distance no more than D from the longest chain (illustrated by the blocks
with green diamonds in Figure 6). If there are two chains that forked at more than D blocks deep from the
tip of the chain, then each honest node will mine on one side of those two chains.
Fig. 6: D-distance-greedy protocol with D = 0, 1, 2
The intuition behind this protocol is the following:
1. Although we are limiting the mining strategy of honest nodes to small distance blocks, the growth of
the longest chain is still high. Using a heuristic argument, [10] claims that the expected growth rate
AD(1− β) of the longest chain following the D-distance greedy protocol, is (1−β)(D+1)D+1√(D+1)! . Note that as D
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increases, the expected growth rate of the honest tree, according to this calculation, approaches e(1−β).
Based on this calculation, the anticipated threshold of largest adversarial stake that can be tolerated
under a private attack, βD = ADAD+e , approaches the ideal threshold of β = 0.5.
2. Second, limiting the honest strategy to only grow on nodes that are near the tip of the longest chain
might, at the outset, seems to render the balance attack of Section 2.1 ineffective. Indeed, an argument
is made in [10] to imply the security of the D-distance-greedy protocol against all possible adversarial
strategies as long as the adversarial stake is less than βD.
In this section, we show that both these results of [10] are inaccurate. We do this by focusing on the case
of D = 1 first. Specifically:
1. For D = 1, we show that the precise expected growth of the longest chain of the honest block tree
is A1(1 − β) = 1−βe−2 ≈ 1.3922(1 − β) and not
√
2(1 − β). This implies that, even if the adversary is
controlling a smaller fraction of stake, say β = 0.339, than the threshold βD=1 = 0.3422 claimed in [10],
the simple private attack can succeed with probability close to one. A formal statement and proof is
in Appendix A.4; a precise calculation of the growth rate for general D appears to be a challenging
mathematical problem.
2. More critically, we show that a balance attack similar to the one from Section 2.1 can still be effective
on the D-distance-greedy protocol – and the efficacy is primarily achieved by slowing down the growth
rate of the honest strategy. The D-distance-greedy protocol is not secure against balance attack, even if
the adversary controls less than βD = ADAD+e fraction of the stake, with the correct AD we compute in
Appendix A.4. The actual security threshold on β is strictly smaller; the private attack considered in [10]
is strictly weaker than a standard adversary studied in the literature which can perform the balance
attack. This is described in detail next.
For general D larger than one, a balance attack can successfully slow down the growth rate of honest
nodes, but a precise computation of the slowed down growth rate is a challenging problem. We discuss
security implications for large D at the end of this section. [10] expects that the security of the protocol
increases as D increases, eventually achieving the ideal threshold of β = 0.5. Contrarily, we find that for
a large enough D, the D-distance-greedy protocol becomes insecure; none of the blocks can be confirmed,
regardless of how deep the block is in the current block chain. This is also true for the g-greedy protocol
with a large enough g. This follows from the fact that when every node is mining on every block, the entire
block tree becomes unstable: the prefix of the longest chain keeps changing indefinitely. Hence, even if the
conjectured growth rate of AD =
(D+1)
D+1
√
(D+1)!
were true for large D, the desired threshold of β = 0.5 cannot
be achieved.
Balance Attack on D-distance-greedy Protocol. We consider the same balance attack, now on 1-
distance-greedy protocol. Here we assume that, when two chains with equal length are broadcast in the
network, honest nodes will split into two groups with equal stake proportion, where each group picks one
chain as the longest chain and mines on the corresponding tree under 1-distance-greedy protocol. This balance
attack is described formally in Appendix A.6.
Perhaps surprisingly, this balance attack can slow down the growth rate of the honest block tree: we show
the growth rate of the longest chain to be A˜1(1−β) = 4(1−β)3e2−19 ≈ 1.26(1−β) < A1(1−β). A formal statement
and proof of this result is in Appendix A.5. We note that this result is against the grain of the Nakamoto
longest chain protocol, where no adversary strategy can slow down the growth rate of the block tree, even
though the honest nodes can be potentially split into working on two different chains of equally long length.
Thus when the proportion of adversarial stake β falls in the interval ( A˜1
A˜1+e
, A1A1+e ), the adversarial private
tree will be ahead of the public longest chain, and the balance attack in conjunction with the private attack
is fatal (i.e., any confirmed block can be reversed no matter how deep the block is buried in the longest
chain).
We illustrate the high level idea of the slow-down effect of 1-distance-greedy protocol with Figure 7. The
scenario at the top of Figure 7 is a pure honest tree with one block at height `− 1 and two blocks at height
`, and honest nodes will mine on all these three blocks with rate 1 − β; while the scenario at the bottom
is two trees balanced by the adversary, where child-blocks of every block are generated as a Poisson point
process with rate 0.5(1 − β) since honest nodes are split. Note that the number of blocks at height ` and
`+ 1 increases with the same rates in these two scenarios (1− β and 2(1− β) respectively). However, when
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the number of blocks at height ` increases by one in both scenarios, the growth rate of blocks at height `+1
becomes 3(1− β) in the top scenario but only 2.5(1− β) in the bottom. Since only half of honest nodes will
benefit from, or mine on the new block due to splitting, the growth rate of the public longest chain is slowed
down. A formal analysis of this slow-down effect is provided in Appendix A.5.
Fig. 7: The slow-down effect of 1-distance-greedy protocol
We also use simulation to verify the analysis above. The simulation starts with a fork with length 2.
The honest nodes follow 1-distance-greedy protocol with stake proportion 1− β while adversary will always
mine on every block in his private view. Whenever the two trees have different height, the adversary will
reveal a private chain immediately appending to the shorter public tree if he can. For simplicity, when two
chains with equal length are revealed in the public view, honest nodes will split into two groups with equal
stake proportion. We set f∆ = 0.1 in each round and simulated the case β = 0.32 and β = 0.33 for 10000
rounds and 20000 rounds respectively. Note that the simulation can be made more accurate with a finer
discretization and a longer run-time. The depth of the longest fork and its associated cumulative probability
is plotted in Figure 8 for fixed parameters β = 0.32 and β = 0.33. One can see that the success probability
(1 minus the probability in the plots) of private attack will converge to 0 as for longer fork, while the
success probability of balance attack will saturate to some constant, which indicates that, using the balance
attack, the adversary can succeed in creating a fork of any length with some non-negligible probability. This
simulation results immediately verify the slow-down effect of 1-distance-greedy. When the growth rate of the
public longest chain is slowed down due to splitting for some time, the adversarial private tree will be ahead
of the public longest chain, and the balance attack can continue to succeed easily in the future and create
forks with any length.
Fig. 8: Comparison of CDF of the longest fork from genesis caused by private attack and balance attack for various
β. Due to the slow-down effect, the success probability of balance attack saturates to some constant number.
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For generalD-distance-greedy, the growth rate of the honest chain can also be slowed down from AD(1−β)
by splitting the honest nodes. However, this balance attack of keeping two chains of balanced lengths is a
sub-optimal strategy (for the adversary). The adversary can maintain multiple balanced chains, splitting
honest nodes as much as possible. Under such an attack, we conjecture that the growth rate of the public
longest chain can be slowed down all the way to 1−β, eliminating amplification entirely. However, how large
β needs to be to make this attack successful remains an open question, and we defer it as a future research
direction.
Fixing the Slow-Down Effect. As an approach to ameliorate this slow-down effect for the 1-distance-
greedy protocol, we introduce the following refined tie breaking rule. Recall that 1-distance-greedy protocol
prescribes an honest node to mine on one of the longest chains (chosen randomly if there are multiple longest
chains), and also simultaneously mine on its parent block and all its sibling blocks.
Definition 1 (Heavy Longest Chain tie breaking rule for 1-distance-greedy protocol). When there
are multiple longest chains with equal lengths, mine on one node that has the largest number of sibling blocks,
and simultaneously mine on its parent block and all its sibling blocks. Further ties can be broken arbitrarily.
For example, let h denote the height of the longest chain. If there are two nodes at height h− 1, one with
two children blocks and another with three children blocks, then honest nodes will mine on the three sibling
blocks at height h and its parent. If there are three nodes at height h− 1, one with two children blocks and
the rest with three children blocks each, then each honest node will mine on one set of three sibling blocks
and its parent (chosen arbitrarily). If this finer tie breaking rule is adopted, then we can prove the following
“chain growth lemma” for the 1-distance-greedy protocol.
Lemma 1 (Chain Growth). Under the synchronous network setting with bounded message delay from [10],
an adversary cannot slow down the honest chain growth. That is, no matter what the adversary does, the
honest nodes will grow a chain that is at least as long as if the adversary does not generate any blocks.
Proof. By the analysis in Appendix A.4, for 1-distance-greedy protocol, the growth rate of the longest chain
in the honest tree depends only on the number of sibling blocks on the tip, then the adversary cannot slow
down the honest chain under this tie breaking rule since honest nodes are always choosing the longest chain
with the largest potential growth rate. To be more specific, whenever the adversary publishes a block B and
some honest nodes start to mine on B under the tie breaking rule in Definition 1, which means that either
B is on a deeper level or the number of sibling blocks of B is no less than the number of sibling blocks of
the main chain which is chosen before B is revealed; in both cases, the growth of the honest tree will not be
slowed down.
Thus the chain growth property for 1-distance-greedy protocol can be guaranteed under the tie breaking
rule in Definition 1 with the chain growth lemma proved above. This is not true for the random tie breaking
rule, as we show with balance attack in Appendix A.5. However, a rigorous analysis of common prefix
property for 1-distance-greedy protocol still remains a challenging research problem.
When there are multiple longest chains to be mined on, the chain growth lemma holds as long as the
honest nodes can choose the one that will ensure fastest expected growth. However, it is not straightforward
to do this for D > 1; defining an appropriate tie breaking rule and proving a corresponding chain growth
lemma remains an interesting research problem.
2.3 Conclusion
We can summarize two lessons from this section. First, the simple conversion of Nakamoto protocol to PoS
as espoused in [10,11] is vulnerable – thus the question of a simple Nakamoto longest chain protocol for PoS
is an open problem. Second, it is important to conduct a mathematically complete and thorough analysis of
the security under a formal model covering a wide class of adversarial actions – thus any new proposal has
to be subject to the high bar of formal security analysis. The results in the rest of the paper are inspired
by these two lessons: we present a new extension of the Nakamoto protocol to PoS in §3 and its security
analysis in §6 under a security model described in §4.
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3 Nakamoto-PoS Protocol Sketch
The attempt to mimic Nakamoto protocol in PoS by [11] is not secure (as demonstrated in §2); however
the protocol with g = 0 is still a very natural extension. We notice that while the balance attack was
demonstrably stronger than the private attack for all g ≥ 1, it was not as effective for the special case of
g = 0. It is possible that the g-greedy protocol is secure for g = 0 and that βg = 11+e is the true threshold
of largest adversarial stake that can be tolerated. This remains an open question.
In this section we show that a subtle modification to the 0-greedy protocol of [11] can indeed be proved to
be secure under a formal security model. The 0-greedy protocol of [11] prescribes honest nodes to grow on all
the longest chains of the block tree. In our subtly modified protocol we only grow on one of the longest chains
(the chain which was seen the earliest); this is directly following the Nakamoto protocol where the mining
process is conducted on only one of the leaves of the longest chains in the block tree. For this protocol, that
we call Nakamoto-PoS, we show security in a standard security model (§4) as long as the adversarial stake is
no more than 11+2e (§6). Although our suggested change to the basic 0-greedy protocol appears subtle, this
change plays a currently indispensable mathematical role in the security proofs in §6. When the honest nodes
mine on multiple longest chains simultaneously, honest blocks can contribute to growing multiple chains. The
adversary only needs to make sure that those chains are balanced as in the balance attack.
It remains open whether the 0-greedy protocol of [11] is secure and whether the true threshold of adver-
sarial stake for security is 11+e (currently our mathematical techniques need the more conservative threshold
of 11+2e ); these questions appear to be of significant mathematical depth and constitute an active research
problem but outside the scope of this paper.
[11] generalized the basic 0-greedy protocol by changing the fork-choice rule (leading to the family of
g-greedy protocols), but as we have seen in §2, this direction is inherently insecure. Instead, we generalize our
basic Nakamoto-PoS protocol differently: we retain the fork choice rule, but change the update of the random-
ness used in mining. We describe this next, starting from first principles, starting with the Nakamoto longest
chain rule. A leader election (mining process) uses a general hash function of the form: hash = H(header).
One option is to use header = (time, secret key, parentBk.hash). Including time ensures there is one leader
election per time slot. The secret key links the hash to the owner of the stake. Including parentBk.hash pro-
vides an unpredictable source of common randomness, which ensures that the outcome of the election can
not be predicted in advance. However, this allows the adversary to grind on the parentBk.hash, appending
to all blocks in the block tree. This grinding attack is the same as the NaS attack and the growth rate of
the private tree grown by an adversary is amplified by a factor of e (Appendix A.1).
In order to mitigate this grinding attack, we propose a principled approach by changing the source of
randomness in mining: we call our scheme as c-correlated-Nakaomoto-PoS. Let height of a block b be the
number of blocks in the chain between the genesis and b (including b but not the genesis). The height of the
genesis block is zero. Instead of updating the source of randomness at every block with parentBk.hash, we
only update it at blocks of height multiples of c. An example with c = 5 is shown in Figure 9. The genesis
block is initiated with a bit sequence to be used as a source of randomness denoted by a red triangle. All of
its descendant blocks inherit the same bit sequence as a source of randomness, until it reaches height c = 5.
This ensures that for blocks at height less than c, even the adversarial blocks can only run one election at a
time slot with the header (time, secret key,N).
Note that the content of the block is added after the leader election. Hence, the adversary can make
multiple versions of the new block with the same header, but carrying different transactions and even
appending to different parent blocks (as long as the parent block has a common source of randomness N. An
example is shown for two blocks with the header (time=4,secret key=A,N).
When the block chain reaches a height multiple of c, for example five in the figure, the block updates
its source of randomness with the hash of the parent block. This gives an opportunity for the adversary to
create multiple blocks at height five and grind on those multiple sources of randomness. This correlation
parameter c gives the system designer the control to gracefully interpolate between full grinding attack with
amplification factor e (when c = 1) and no grinding attack with amplification factor of one (when c = ∞).
One downside of having a large c is that it allows each node to predict further into the future when it will
be elected a leader. This opens new doors for attacks such as bribing, which is outside the security model
studied in this paper. We discuss such external security threats in §8.
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Fig. 9: A snapshot of a block tree under c-correlation protocol with c = 5. Each block has a header consisting of
header=(RandomSource of ParentBk, time). The content of the block includes the public key of the coin (which we
only denote by H or A in the figure), transactions, and the RandomSource of the block to be used in the next election.
This random source is preserved from parent to children blocks, until one mines a block at height that is a multiple of
c. In such a case, new RandomSource is drawn using the hash of the current header and the secret key of the miner.
Permissionless PoS. One major advantage of the Nakamoto protocol in the proof of work setting is its
permissionless setting: anyone can join (leave) the system by simply contributing (extricating) computing
power for the mining process. Under the PoS setting the stakes are used in lieu of the computing power. To
support a protocol that is close to a permissionless system, we need to handle the case when the stake is
dynamically varying. Unlike the case of compute power, the entry/removal of stake has to be more carefully
orchestrated: if a change in the stake takes effect immediately after the transaction has been included in the
blockchain, then this gives an opportunity for the adversary to grind on the secret key of the header (time,
secret key, common source of randomness). Concretely, once an adversary has generated a block, it can add
a transaction that moves all its stake to a new coin with a new pair of public and secret keys. The adversary
can keep drawing a new coin and simulating the next leader election, until it finds one that wins. This is a
serious concern as the adversary can potentially win all elections.
To prevent such a grinding on the coin, we use s-truncation introduced in [1, 11]. s-truncation has two
components: using stakes from ancestor blocks and a fork choice rule. The winning probability of a leader
election uses the stake computed at an ancestor block (that is s blocks deep in the block chain) of the parent
block that is currently being mined on. However, this allows an adversary to launch a long range attack, for
any value of s < ∞. To launch a long range attack, an adversary grows a private block tree. Once it has
grown for longer than s blocks, then it can grind on the coin to win the election for the next block, and
add the favorable transaction to the first ancestor block. As all blocks in this private tree are adversarial,
the consistency of the transactions can be maintained by re-signing all intermediate blocks. This allows the
adversary to win all elections after s private blocks, and eventually take over the honest block chain.
To prevent this long range attack, we propose a variation of Nakamoto’s longest chain rule, that we call
s-truncation. When presented with a chain that forks from current longest chain, a node compares the two
chains according to the following rule. Both chains are truncated up to s blocks after the forking. Whichever
truncated chain was created in a shorter time (and hence denser) is chosen to be mined on. This ensures
that honest block chains will be chosen over privately grown adversarial chains with long range attacks. A
detailed description of the c-correlation, s-truncation, Nakamoto-PoS protocol is in §5.
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4 Security Model
A blockchain protocol Π is directed by an environment Z(1κ), where κ is the security parameter. This
environment (i) initiates a set of participating nodes N ; (ii) manages nodes through an adversary A which
corrupts a dynamically changing subset of nodes; (iii) manages all accesses of each node from/to the envi-
ronment including broadcasting and receiving messages of blocks and transactions.
The protocol Π proceeds in discrete time units called slots, each consisting of δ milliseconds (also called
the slot duration), i.e. the time argument in calling the hash function should be in δ millisecond increments.
A ledger associates at most one block to each slot among those generated (or proposed) by participating
nodes, each running a distributed protocol. Collectively, at most one block per slot is selected to be included
in the ledger according to a rule prescribed in the protocol Π. Similar to [15], we assume that every user has
access to the current global time and network delays do not exceed the slot duration.
We follow the security model of [12] with an ideal functionality F . This includes diffuse functionality and
key and transaction functionality as described below. With a protocol Π, adversary A, environment Z, and
security parameter κ, we denote by VIEWn,FΠ,A,Z(κ) the view of a node n ∈ N who has access to an ideal
functionality F .
We consider a synchronous, round-based network model similar to that of [8, 12, 15] that accounts for
adversarially controlled message delivery and immediate node corruption. All broadcast messages are deliv-
ered by the adversary, which is synchronized in rounds. Each round is ∆ milliseconds (also called the round
duration), and we allow the adversary to selectively delay messages sent by honest nodes, with the following
restrictions: (i) the messages broadcast in the previous round must be delivered by the beginning of the
current round; and (ii) the adversary cannot forge or alter any message sent by an honest node. This is a
synchronous version of the so called delayed diffuse functionality (denoted by DDiffuse∆ in [8, 15]).
The dynamically changing set of honest (or uncorrupted) nodes H ⊆ N strictly follows the blockchain
protocol Π. The key registration functionality (from [15]) is initialized with the nodes N and their
respective stakes (stake1, . . . , stake|N |) such that the fraction of the initial stake owned by node n is
staken/
∑
m∈N stakem. At the beginning of each round, the adversary can dynamically corrupt any node
n ∈ N , with a permission from the environment Z in the form of a message (Corrupt, n). For the honest
nodes, the functionality can sample a new public/secret key pair for each node and record them. For the
corrupted nodes, if it is missing a public key, the adversary can set the node’s public-key, and the public
keys of corrupt nodes will be marked as such.
Any of the following actions are allowed to take place. (i) A node can retrieve its public/secret key pair
from the functionality. (ii) A node can retrieve the whole database of public keys from the functionality.
(iii) The environment can send a message (Create) to spawn a new node, whose local view only contains
the genesis block, and the functionality samples its public/secret key pair. (iv) The environment can request
a transaction, specifying its recipient. The functionality adjusts the stakes according to the transactions
that make into the current ledger, as prescribed by the protocol Π. The adversary has access to the state
of a corrupt node n, and will be activated in place of node n with restrictions imposed by F . When the
adversary releases the control of a corrupt node, the node retrieves the current view of the honest nodes at
the beginning of the following round.
Verifiable Random Function (VRF). Verifiable Random Functions (VRF), first introduced in [18],
generates a pseudorandom number with a proof of its correctness. A node with a secret key sk can call
VRFprove(·, sk) to generates a pseudorandom output Fsk(·) along with a proof pisk(·). Other nodes that
have the proof and the corresponding public key pk can check that the output has been generated by VRF, by
calling VRFverify(·, output, pisk(·), pk). An efficient implementation of VRF was introduced in [9], which
formally satisfy Definition 8 in Appendix C. This ensures that the output of a VRF is computationally
indistinguishable from a random number even if the public key pk and the function VRFprove is revealed.
Key Evolving Signature schemes (KES). We propose using forward secure signature schemes [5] to
sign the transactions to be included in a generated block. This prevents the adversary from altering the
transactions in the blocks mined in the past. Efficient Key Evolving Signature (KES) schemes have been
proposed in [8,14] where keys are periodically erased and generated, while the new key is linked to the previous
one. This is assumed to be available to the nodes via the ideal functionality F . This ensures immutability of
the contents of the blocks.
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5 Protocol description
We explain our protocol following terminologies from [8] and emphasize the difference where it applies. The
ideal functionality F captures the resources available to the nodes in order to securely execute the protocol.
When a PoS system is launched, a collection N of nodes are initialized. Each node n ∈ N is initialized with
a coin possessing stake staken, a verification/signing key pair (KES.vkn,KES.skn), and a public/secret key
pair (VRF.pkn,VRF.skn). The Key Evolving Signature key pair (KES) is used to sign and verify the content
of a block, while the Verifiable Random Function key pair (VRF) is used to verify and elect leader nodes who
generate new blocks. All the nodes and the adversary know all public keys {pkn = (KES.vkn,VRF.pkn)}n∈N .
The genesis block contains all public keys and initial stakes of all nodes, {(pkn, staken)}n∈N , and also contains
a nonce in genesis.content.RandSource. This nonce is used as a seed for the randomness. The height of a
block in a chain is counted from the genesis (which is at height zero). We denote the time at the inception
of the genesis block as zero (milliseconds), such that the i-th slot starts at the time δ · i milliseconds (since
the inception of the genesis block). Nakamoto-PoS protocol is executed by the nodes and is assumed to run
indefinitely. Our security analysis applies when the total running time is polynomial in the security parameter
κ. At each slot a node starts with a local chain C, which it tries to append new blocks on.
Proposer selection. At each slot, a fresh subset of nodes are randomly elected to be the leaders, who have
the right to generate new blocks. To be elected one of the leaders, each node first decides on where to append
the next block, in its local view of the blocktree. This choice of a parent block is governed by the fork choice
rule prescribed in the protocol. For example, in BitCoin, an honest node appends a new block to the highest
node in the local view of the blocktree. This is known as Nakamoto protocol. We propose s-truncated longest
chain rule that includes the Nakamoto protocol as a special case, which we define later in this section.
A random number of leaders are elected in a single slot, and the collective average block generation rate
is controlled by a global parameter ρ that is adaptively set by the ideal functionality F . The individual block
generation rate is proportional to the node’s stake. The stakes are updated continuously as the ledger is
updated, but only a coin in the ledger s time slots earlier can be used in the election (the same parameter s
as used in the truncated longest chain rule), and is formally defined later in this section.
Concretely, at each slot, a node n ∈ N draws a number distributed uniformly at random in a predefined
range. If this is less than the product of its stake and a parameter ρ (Algorithm 1 line 17), the node is elected
one of the leaders of the slot and gains the right to generate a new block. Ideally, we want to simulate such
a random trial while ensuring that the outcome (i) is verifiable by any node after the block generation; (ii)
is unpredictable by any node other than node n before the generated block has been broadcast; and (iii) is
independent of any other events. Verifiability in (i) is critical in ensuring consistency among untrusted pool
of nodes. Without unpredictability in (ii), the adversary can easily take over the blockchain by adaptively
corrupting the future leaders. Without independence in (iii), a corrupt node might be able to grind on the
events that the simulator (and hence the outcome of the election) depends on, until it finds one that favors
its chances of generating future blocks. Properties (ii) and (iii) are challenges unique to PoS systems, as
predicting and grinding attacks are computationally costly in PoW systems.
To implement such a simulator in a distributed manner among mutually untrusting nodes, [8,13] proposed
using Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs), formally defined in Appendix C. In our proposed protocol, a
node n uses its secret key VRF.sk to generate a pseudorandom hash and a proof of correctness (Algorithm 1
line 16). If node n is elected a leader and broadcasts a new block, other nodes can verify the correctness with
the corresponding public key VRF.pk and the proof (which is included in the block content). This ensures
unpredictability, as only node n has access to its secret key, and verifiability, as any node can access all
public keys and verify that the correctness of the random leader election.
The pseudorandom hash generated by VRFprove(x,VRF.sk), depends on the external source of ran-
domness, (x,VRF.sk), that is fed into the function. Along with the secret key VRF.sk, which we refer to as
the private source of randomness, we prescribe constructing a header x that contains the time (in a multiple
of δ milliseconds) and a dynamically changing common source of randomness. Including the time ensures
that the hash is drawn exactly once every slot. Including the common source of randomness ensures that
the random elections cannot be predicted in advance, even by the owner of the secret key. Such private
predictability by the owner of the secret key leads to other security concerns that we discuss in §8.
A vanilla implementation of such a protocol might (a) update stakes immediately and (b) use the hash
of the previous block (i.e. the parent of the newly generated block in the main chain as defined by the fork
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chain rule) as the common source of randomness. Each of these choices creates a distinct opportunity for
an adversary to grind on, that could result in serious security breaches. We explain the potential threats in
the following and propose how to update the randomness and the stake, respectively, to prevent each of the
grinding attacks. A formal analysis of the resulting protocol is provided in §6.
Updating the common source of randomness. One way to ensure unpredictability by even the owner
of the secret key is to draw randomness from the dynamically evolving blocktree. For example, we could use
the hash of the parent block (i.e. the block that a newly generated block will be appended to). This hash
depends only on the parent block proposer’s secret key, the time, and the source of randomness included in
the header of the parent block. In particular, this hash does not depend on the content of the parent block,
to prevent an additional source of grinding attack. However, such a frequent update of the source creates an
opportunity for the adversary to grind on. At every round, a corrupt node can run as many leader elections
as the number of blocks in the blocktree, each appending to a different block as its parent. To mitigate such
grinding attack, we propose a new update rule for the source of randomness which we call c-correlation.
A parameter c ∈ Z determines how frequently we update. The common source of randomness remains
the same for c blocks, and is updated only when the current block to be generated is at a height that is a
multiple of c (Algorithm 1 line 19). When updating, the hash of that newly appended block is used as the
source of randomness. When c = 1, this recovers the vanilla update rule, where a grinding attack is most
effective. We can increase c to gracefully increase the security threshold. A formal analysis is provided in §6.
When c = ∞, every block uses the nonce at the genesis block as the common source of randomness. This
makes the entire future leader elections predictable in private, by the owners of the secret keys.
Dynamic stake. The stake of a node n (or equivalently that of the coin the node possesses) is not only
changing over time as transactions are added to the blocktree, but also over which chain we are referring to
in the blocktree. Different chains in the tree contain different sequences of transactions, leading to different
stake allocations. One needs to specify which chain we are referring to, when we access the stake of a node.
Such accesses are managed by the ideal functionality F (Algorithm 1 line 12).
When running a random election to append a block to a parent block b at height `− 1 in the blocktree,
a coin can be used for this election of creating a block with height ` if and only if the coin is in the stake at
the block with height `− s on the chain leading to block b. Accordingly, a node n has a winning probability
proportional to staken(b) when mining on block b, where staken(b) denotes the stake belonging to node n
as in the (s − 1)-th block before b. Starting from an initial stake distribution staken(bgenesis), we add to or
subtract from the stake according to all transactions that (i) involve node n (or the coin that belongs to
node n); (ii) are included in the chain of blocks from the genesis to the reference block b; and (iii) is included
in the block chain at least s− 1 blocks before b. Here, s ∈ Z is a global parameter.
When s=1, the adversary can grind on (the secret key VRF.sk of) the coin. For example, once a corrupt
node is elected as a leader at some time slot and proposed a new block, it can include transactions in that
block to transfer all stake to a coin that has a higher chance of winning the election at later time slots. To
prevent such a grinding on the coin, a natural attempt is to use the stake in the block with height `−s when
trying to create a block at height ` on the main chain. However, there remains still a vulnerability, if we use
the Nakamoto protocol (also known as the longest chain rule) from BitCoin as the fork choice rule.
Consider a corrupt node growing its own private chain from the genesis block (or any block in the
blocktree). A private chain is a blockchain that the corrupt node grows privately without broadcasting it
to the network until it is certain that it can take over the public blocktree. Under the Nakamoto protocol,
this happens when the private chain is longer (in the number of blocks) than the longest chain in the public
blocktree. Note that the public blocktree grows at a rate proportional to ρ and the total stake of the nodes
that append to the public blocktree. With a grinding attack, the private chain, which is entirely composed
of the blocks generated by the corrupt node, can eventually take over the public blocktree.
Initially, the private chain grows at a rate proportional to ρ and the stake controlled by the corrupt
node. However, after s blocks from the launch of the private chain, the corrupt node can start grinding on
the private key of the coin; once a favorable coin is found, it can transfer the stake to the favored coin by
including transactions in the first ancestor block in the private chain. This is possible as all blocks in the
private chain belong to the corrupt node. It can alter any content of the private chain and sign all blocks
again. With such a grinding attack (which we refer to as coin grinding), the corrupt node can potentially be
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elected a leader every slot in the private chain, eventually overtaking the public blocktree. To prevent this
private grinding attack, we propose using an s-truncation as the fork choice rule.
Fork choice rule. An honest node follows a fork choice rule prescribed in the protocol. The purpose is to
reach a consensus on which chain of blocks to maintain, in a distributed manner. Eventually, such chosen
chain of blocks produces a final ledger of transactions. Under the Nakamoto protocol, a node appends the
next generated block to the longest chain in its local view of the blocktree. Unlike PoW systems, Nakamoto
protocol can lead to serious security issues for PoS systems as discussed above. We propose using the following
s-truncated longest chain rule, introduced in [1, 11].
At any given time slot, an honest node keeps track of one main chain that it appends its next generated
block to. Upon receiving a new chain of blocks, it needs to decide which chain to keep. Instead of comparing
the length of those two chains, as in Nakamoto protocol, we compare the creation time of the first s blocks
after the fork in truncated versions of those two chains (Algorithm 1 line 34). Let bfork be the block where
those two chains fork. The honest node counts how long it takes in each chain to create, up to s blocks
after the fork. The chain with shorter time for those s blocks is chosen, and the next generated block will
be appended to the newest block in that selected chain. When s = ∞, the stake is fixed since the genesis
block, which leads to a system that is secure but not adaptive. This is undesirable, as even a coin with no
current stake can participate in block generation. We propose using an appropriate global choice of s <∞,
that scales linearly with the security parameter κ. This ensures that the protocol meets the desired level of
security, while adapting to dynamic stake updates. One caveat is that we only apply this s-truncation when
comparing two chains that both have at least s blocks after those two chains forked. If one of the chain has
less than s blocks after forking, we use the longest chain rule to determine which chain to mine on. This is
necessary in order to ensure that s-truncation is only applied to chains with enough blocks, such that our
probabilistic analysis results hold.
Content of the block. Once a node is elected a leader, all unconfirmed transactions in its buffer are added
to the content (Algorithm 1 line 22). Along with the transactions, the content of the block also includes
the identity of the coin that won the election, and the hash and proof from VRFprove(·). This allows
other nodes to verify the accuracy of the leader election. A common source of randomness RandSource is
also included, to be used in the next leader election. The state variable in the content contains the hash of
parent block, which ensures that the content of the parent block cannot be altered. Finally, the header and
the content is signed with the forward secure signature KES.skn.
Note that the content of the block is added after the leader election, in order to avoid any grinding
on the content. However, this allows the adversary to create multiple blocks with the same header but
different content. In particular, after one leader election, the adversary can create multiple blocks appending
to different parent blocks, as long as those parent blocks share the same common source of randomness.
Such copies of a block with the same header but different contents are known as a “forkable string” in [15]
or “non-core blocks” in [11]. We show in the next section that the Nakamoto-PoS protocol is secure against
all such variations of attacks.
rmax total rounds of the system
β total proportion of the adversarial stake
f block arrival rate per millisecond
δ slot duration
∆ round duration
κ security parameter
c correlation parameter
s parameter in the fork choice rule
φc maximum growth rate of a private tree
Table 2: The parameters used in our analysis.
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6 Security analysis of the static stake protocol
Security of PoW systems, e.g. [12], rely on the fact that total number of blocks generated by the adversary
under a PoW system grows linearly in time. For a PoS system, the grinding attack allows the adversary
to generate exponentially many blocks. However, one can hope to achieve security if the adversarial blocks
added in any single chain is still growing at most linearly. We make this intuition precise in the following
sections.
First, in Section 6.1, we focus on a particular private attack, where the adversary privately grows a
block tree with full grinding until it is long enough to take over the public block chain. We provide a tight
characterization of the growth rate of this tree, denoted by φc, where c ∈ Z+ is a parameter of our choice in
c-correlation. The adversary’s mining power is effectively amplified by this factor of φc.
This analysis provides a crucial building block in providing full security analysis for any adversary, in
Section 6.2. We show that the system is secure against all attacks allowed under our model in §4, as long
as the adversary controls less than 1/(1 + 2φc) proportion of the stake. This includes private chain attack,
grinding on the coin, and grinding on the parent block, as well as an adversary that creates multiple copies
of blocks with the same header, possibly appending to different parent blocks.
Throughout this section, we assume that (i) the stake is not changing over time, (ii) we use s = ∞ in
s-truncation, (iii) the slot duration is the same as the round duration, i.e. δ = ∆, and use the terms slot
and round interchangeably, and (iv) f is the expected arrival rate of a block per millisecond such that f∆r
blocks are generated in r rounds on average. Note that when s =∞, the s-truncation rule is the same as the
longest chain rule proposed by Nakamoto.
6.1 Analysis of the private Nothing-at-Stake attack
We analyze a particular attack, and the analysis will be used as a fundamental building block to prove
security of our protocol. Concretely, consider a private Nothing-at-Stake (NAS) attack, where an adversary
grows a block tree in isolation. This private tree is hidden from the public view, until it is long enough to
take over the public tree mined by the honest nodes. This is the PoS counterpart of the attack originally
analyzed by Nakamoto in [19]. The success of this attack depends on whether that private tree can grow
faster than the public tree or not. We analyze how much stake the adversary needs to control in order to
succeed. This threshold, denoted by βc below, increases with increasing c, i.e. how long we keep the source of
common randomness fixed in c-correlation. Eventually βc converges to 1/2, recovering the security of private
attack under PoW.
Under the c-correlation protocol, we define (φc, ψc) > 0 as the unique pair satisfying
Fc(φc, ψc) := − 1
φc
+ 1 + ψc + (1 + ψc) ln
( 1
φc(1 + ψc)
)
+
1
c
ln(1 + cψc) + ψc ln
(
1 +
1
cψc
)
= 0 , and (1)
ψc =
c− cφc +
√
(c− cφc)2 + 4cφc
2cφc
. (2)
Let Fc(φ) := Fc(φ, ψ) with ψ satisfying Eq. (2). The uniqueness follows from the fact that ∇φFc(φ) < 0
for all φ > 0 as shown in Eq. (18). In the following theorem, we show that φc is an upper bound on the
growth rate of the private tree, with a high probability. ψc does not have an immediate interpretation, and
is an auxiliary variable that shows up in the proof of Proposition 1, provided in Appendix B.2.
Proposition 1. Under the Nakamoto-PoS protocol with c = O(1), a private tree grown in isolation by an
adversary with β fraction of the stake for r rounds starting from the genesis block has a height upper bounded
by φcβf∆r(1 + ε) with a probability larger than 1− e−Ω(εφcβf∆r).
c 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
φc e 2.22547 2.01030 1.88255 1.79545 1.73110 1.68103 1.64060 1.60705 1.57860
βc
1
1+e
0.31003 0.33219 0.34691 0.35772 0.36615 0.37299 0.37870 0.38358 0.38780
Table 3: Numerically computed growth rate φc and stake threshold βc.
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Note that βf∆r is the expected number of blocks generated by the adversary, if mining honestly without
grinding. With grinding, this is amplified by a factor of φc. With c-correlation, this amplification factor is
reduced from e when c = 1 to 1 when c =∞.
When the private tree grows faster than the public tree, the adversary can eventually take over the entire
block chain. This happens when 1 − β < βφc, or equivalently β > 1/(1 + φc). We use βc := 1/(1 + φc) to
denote this threshold on successful private NaS attack. Note that in Theorem 1, β < 1/(1 + 2φc) is required
for security against a more powerful adversary who can also launch a hybrid of private and public attack.
For any given value of c, we can numerically compute the growth rate as shown in the table above. This
provides a guideline for a practitioner to choose the appropriate c-correlation, in order to achieve the desired
level of security. Note that e ' 2.71828 is the base of the natural logarithm. For a large enough c, the growth
rate converges to one. The following analysis shows that the rate of convergence is 1 +Θ(
√
(ln c)/c).
Proposition 2. For large c, φc = 1 +
√
ln c
c + o
(√
ln c
c
)
, and under the hypotheses of Proposition 1, the
height of the private tree is upper bounded by φcβf∆r(1 + ε) with probability 1− e−Ω(εφcβf∆rc−1
√
ln c ).
growth rate φc − 1
correlation parameter c
Fig. 10: Theoretical prediction matches the simulated growth rate of the private NaS tree.
A proof is provided in Appendix B.3. To show that this convergence rate is tight, we simulated the
growth of a private tree with NaS attack under the optimal adversarial strategy given in Lemma 5. In
each round of our simulation, for every fixed block that is currently being mined on, its child-blocks are
generated as a Poisson point process with rate 0.1, i.e., βf∆ = 0.1. For each c, we ran the growth of the
tree until the growth rate has sufficiently converged, as shown in Figure 10. Each point is averaged over
10 independent runs. We show the simulation results for c ∈ {2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256} with corresponding
φc ∈ {2.22547, 1.88255, 1.64060, 1.46780, 1.34313, 1.25244, 1.18606, 1.13725}. We plot φc − 1 against c in a
log-log plot. The red uses the numerically computed values of φc, and the blue line is the simulation result.
The gap between the red line and the blue line is due to the coarse discretization of the continuous differential
equation in Eq. (11), and can be made closer with a finer discretization and a longer run-time.
6.2 Main results
We define a set of desirable properties to prove security, introduced in [12] for PoW systems. Let Cdk be the
chain resulting from pruning a chain C up to k, by removing the last k blocks at the end of the chain. Note
that Cdk is a prefix of C, which we denote by Cdk  C. The k-common prefix property ensures that after
pruning a longest chain, it is a prefix of all future longest chains in the local view of any honest node.
Definition 2 (k-common prefix). We say a protocol and a corresponding confirmation rule have a k-
common prefix property, if any pair of longest chains C1 and C2 in the view VIEWn,FΠ,A,Z(κ) of any honest
node n at any two rounds r1 ≤ r2, respectively, satisfy Cdk1  C2.
In the absence of any adversary, each node will contribute to the final ledger as many blocks as their pro-
portion of the stake. In the presence of an adversary, the chain quality property ensures that the contribution
of the adversary is bounded.
Definition 3 ((µ, `)-chain quality). We say a protocol and a corresponding confirmation rule have a (µ, `)-
chain quality property, if in the view VIEWn,FΠ,A,Z(κ) of any honest node n and at any round r, the number
of honest blocks in any consecutive ` blocks of the longest chain is at least µ`.
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Note that this requires chain quality to hold globally over all time. In particular, this implies other chain
quality conditions used in the analyses of Ouroboros [15] and Prism [3,17]. The chain growth property ensures
that no matter what the adversarial strategy is, the longest chain grows at a certain rate.
Definition 4 ((τ, s)-chain growth). We say a protocol and a corresponding confirmation rule have a (τ, s)-
chain growth property, if in the view VIEWn,FΠ,A,Z(κ) of any honest node n and at any round r, n adopts a
longest chain C, then it holds that after s consecutive rounds n adopts a chain that is at least τs blocks longer
than C.
When β < 1/(1 + 2φc), we show that these properties hold with high probability, under the following
assumptions.
Assumption 1. For a choice of a correlation parameter c ∈ Z+, ε > 0, and a security parameter κ > 0,
– the block arrival rate per slot is bounded by f∆ ≤ ε/2,
– we choose the total number of rounds of the system rmax = O(poly(κ)) and rmax ≥ 2κ/f∆,
– the proportion of the adversarially controlled stake is upper bounded by β ≤
(
1−ε
1+2(1+ε)φc
)
,
where φc ∈ [1, e] is the growth rate of a private tree that only depends on c and is defined in Section 6.1.
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1, Nakamoto-PoS with a parameter c ∈ Z+ achieves
– κ-common prefix property in Definition 2,
–
(
(1−2ε)(1−β)
4φc
, κ
)
-chain quality property in Definition 3, and
–
(
(1− β)(1− 2ε)f∆, κ2φcf∆
)
-chain growth property in Definition 4,
with probability at least 1− e−Ω(ε2 κ).
We provide a sketch of the proof in Section 6.3 and a complete proof in Appendix B.1. Our goal is to
generate a transaction ledger that satisfies persistence and liveness as defined in [12]. Together, persistence
and liveness guarantees robust transaction ledger; honest transactions will be adopted to the ledger and be
immutable. The formal definition of persistence and liveness and how they follow from Theorem 1 is derived
in Appendix B.5.
6.3 Sketch of the proof of Theorem 1
Our analysis technique builds upon the security analysis of Bitcoin backbone protocol in [12], with a crucial
difference on how we bound the effect of the adversary on the blockchain. The analysis of Bitcoin backbone
protocol relies on the concentration of the total number of blocks an adversary can generate around its mean,
βf∆r blocks in r rounds, with high probability. For a PoS system, this is no longer true. In r rounds, an
adversary can efficiently generate many, eO(r), blocks with distinct headers. If we include the multiple versions
of the adversarial blocks with the same header, this number is unbounded. This requires an innovation on how
to measure the effectiveness of an adversary on tampering with the consensus of PoS blockchain protocols.
To this end, we propose using the number of in sequence adversarial blocks as the measure of adversarial
attack as formally defined in Eq. (3). Concretely, we build upon the growth rate of the branching process
modeling private NaS tree from Section 6.1 to show that the number of adversarial blocks added in a single
chain in the entire block tree (including the private and public chains) in r rounds is bounded by φcβf∆r.
This allows us to provide k-common prefix property, when β is sufficiently small.
We define a typical execution (Definition 6), and show that this event happens with a large enough
probability (Corollary 1). We complete a proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix B.1, by showing that under the
typical execution, the three desired properties hold.
The analysis crucially relies the intuition that although the corrupt nodes can generate far more blocks
than honest nodes (as grinding on the common source of randomness is possible), there cannot be too many
adversarial blocks in a single chain of blocks. To make this intuition rigorous, we present necessary definitions
and their probabilistic analyses. For an interval S of rounds, i.e. S = [r1, r2] = {r1, r1 + 1, . . . , r2} for some
r1 ≤ r2, we define the following random variables.
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– X[S] is the number of rounds in S where one or more blocks are generated by honest nodes.
– Y [S] is the number of rounds in S where exactly one block is generated by honest nodes.
Under the model defined in §4, each honest node n ∈ N is elected with a probability ρ × staken/Hmax
where [0, Hmax] is the range of the pseudorandom number generated by VRF. Assuming each node con-
trols a fraction of the stake bounded by O(1/|N |), and for a large enough network size |N |, we ap-
proximate the number of blocks generated by the honest nodes in a single slot by a Poisson process
Poi(f∆(
∑
m∈H stakem)/(
∑
m′∈N stakem′)), where we define f , ρ×
∑
m∈N stakem/(Hmax∆) to be the block
generation rate measured in blocks per milliseconds. In practice, a target f is chosen by the system designer
and the ideal functionality provides the appropriate value of ρ to the nodes in each slot. Further, note that
this rate of honest block generation does not depend on the adversarial strategy. The only thing that changes
with the adversarial strategy is where those blocks append to. This leads to the following concentration result
implying that enough unique honest blocks will be generated.
Proposition 3. Under any adversary A, the following inequalities hold with probability at least 1 −
e−Ω(ε
2f∆|S|): |X[S]−EX[S]| ≤ εEX[S] , and |Y [S]−EY [S]| ≤ εEY [S]. Further, setting f < 1/∆ as is done
in practical scenarios, EX[S] ≥ |S|(1 − e−(1−β)f∆) and EY [S] ≥ (1 − β)f∆ |S|e−(1−β)f∆, where β is the
upper bound on adversarially controlled fraction of the stake, i.e. (
∑
m∈H stakem)/(
∑
m′∈N stakem′) ≥ 1−β.
We note that X[S] and Y [S] are the same for the view of the honest nodes and that of the adversarial
nodes because they depend only on the actions of the honest nodes. Every node keeps a history of all blocks
it sees on the blockchain. Thus every node has a view of all the blocks associated the blockchain process in
public. In addition, every node has a view of blocks it mines in private. We note that at the end of each
round, the views of the honest blocks synchronise (by the model we assume) and hence the honest blocks
have a one unique view at the start of a round. We assume that there is a single adversary who has access to
the adversarial strategy and adversarial blocks. Hence the adversarial view is also unique. Further, we note
that every block in the honest view is present in the adversarial view. In addition, the adversarial view can
include blocks mined by the adversary but kept in private (and hence not present in the honest view).
We define a block-tree Tr as the tree of blocks that are seen on the blockchain process in the adversarial
view at the end of round r.
Definition 5 (In-Sequence blocks). Given a block-tree Tr at the end of round r, we define a set of blocks
bi1 , bi2 , · · · , bi` to be in sequence if on Tr, bit is an ancestor of bit+1 for t ∈ [`− 1].
Given a block tree in the adversarial view at the end of round r, Tr; let C be the longest public chain on it.
For S = [r′, r], an interval of rounds, define V [S] as the longest sequence of in-sequence blocks generated by
the adversary during rounds in S on any chain that diverged from C at round after r′ in Tr. More concretely,
V [[r′, r]] := max
C′∈Tr
forking from C
at round after r′
ZC′ [[r′, r]], (3)
where ZC [S] is the number of adversarially mined blocks on a chain C in interval S in the adversarial view
at some round after the largest round in S. By forking we mean that a block in the block tree has multiple
successors. This may occur either due to multiple honest nodes obtaining blocks in a round or due to one or
more adversarially generated blocks.
Proposition 4. With probability at least 1− e−Ω(εβf∆λ), V [[r′, r]] ≤ (1+ ε)φcβf∆(r− r′) for all r′ < r−λ.
We note that all of these need not be released in rounds in S. Thus V [S] is defined based on the view of
the adversary, and may not be seen by the honest nodes. We next define the notion of typical execution.
Definition 6 (Typical execution). An execution is (ε, λ)-typical for β-corrupt system, for ε ∈ (0, 1) and
an integer λ, if, for a set of at least λ consecutive rounds, the following hold for any interval of rounds
S of length more than λ: (a) |X[S] − EX[S]| ≤ εEX[S]; (b) |Y [S] − EY [S]| ≤ εEY [S]; and (c) V [S] ≤
(1 + ε)φcβf∆|S|.
There are at most r2max choices of S, and the following corollary follows from union bound. This corollary
follows from Propositions 3 and 4.
20 Xuechao Wang et al.
Corollary 1. The Nakamoto-PoS protocol executes with (ε, λ)-typical execution with probability at least
1− r2maxe−Ω(ε
2f∆λ).
We will set rmax ≤ poly(κ) and f∆λ = Θ(κ), such that typical execution holds with probability at least
1− e−Ω(ε2κ). In Appendix B.1, we show that the desired properties hold under this typical execution.
7 Security analysis of the dynamic stake protocol
The stake is dynamically being updated via transactions included in the blockchain. If the changes in the
stakes take effect immediately in the leader elections, then the system is vulnerable to an adversary grinding
on the secrete key of the coin as discussed in §5. We propose a buffer of s blocks when updating the stake.
However, a long-range private attack is still possible. The proposed s-truncation scheme that generalizes
Nakamoto longest chain protocol can detect such long-range attacks, and exclude them from the longest
chain. We show that the proposed s-truncation scheme is secure against any adversary under the typical
execution.
Theorem 2. Under the dynamic stake setting, under the Assumption 1, distributed nodes running
Nakamoto-PoS protocol with a choice of s = κ generates a transaction ledger satisfying persistence and
liveness in Definition 7 with probability at least 1− e−Ω(ε2κ).
Proof sketch.We prove it in three steps. First, we show that with static stake setting, common prefix, chain
growth, and chain quality properties still hold for s-truncation protocol with s = κ. Second, we show that
with dynamic stake setting and s stake update rule, the adversary can mine a private chain with consecutive
s blocks that is denser than the public main chain only with a negligible probability. Last, we show that
any consecutive s blocks of the main chain cannot be all adversarial under the (ε, λ)-typical execution. We
provide a complete proof in Appendix B.6.
8 Discussion
There are several attacks that are outside the scope of the security model studied in standard secure
blockchain literature [1,2,6–8,13,15,20]. The design choices in a protocol inevitably trades off with such exter-
nal attacks, but cannot be directly analyzed. This includes nodes behaving rationally according to incentives,
eclipse attacks on network access, and bribing a node with external incentives. Theoretical understanding of
such attacks and securing against them requires different techniques than those studied in this paper, and
we believe they provide interesting new research directions.
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Appendix
A Notes and Proofs for Section 2
A.1 Growth rate of NaS tree
In this section we show that the expected growth rate of the NaS tree is eβ.
The adversary grows a private tree starting with the genesis block as root at time t = 0. At any time t,
the adversary independently mines on all the blocks of its private tree. From the point of view of a fixed
block, its child-blocks are generated as a Poisson point process with rate β i.e., the time interval between
the child-blocks is an exponential random variable with rate β. Let the depth of the tree G(t) denoted by
D(t) and defined as the maximum depth of its blocks. Let the random variable X`(t) denote the number of
blocks at depth i and the expectation is x`(t) = E[X`(t)]. The genesis block is at height zero.
Let X`(t, t′) = X`(t)−X`(t′). For very small values of δ, we have
P
(
X`+1(t+ δ, t) = 1
)
= βδX`(t)− o(δ)
P
(
X`+1(t+ δ, t) = 0
)
= 1− βδX`(t) + o(δ)
P
(
X`+1(t+ δ, t) = k
)
= o(δk−1) ∀k ≥ 2.
Therefore, x`+1(t) satisfies the following differential equation
dx`+1(t)
dt
= βx`(t) ∀` ≥ 0 (4)
with initial conditions x`(0) = 0 ∀ i. The root block satisfies
x0(t) = E
[
X0(t)
]
=
{
1 t > 0
0 t ≤ 0 . (5)
By recursively solving equation (4) and (5), we obtain
x`(t) =
(βt)`
`!
. (6)
From (6) we observe that the expected number of blocks at a fixed depth `, grows with time t. On the other
hand, for a fixed time t, the expected number of blocks tend to zero as the depth increases; both make
intuitive sense.
Equation (6) helps us derive the longest chain growth rate. For small  > 0, let
`u :=
(
1 +
√
`u
)
eβt. (7)
Since X`(t) is positive random variable, Markov’s inequality gives us
P
(
D(t) ≥ `u
)
= P
(
X`u(t) 6= 0
) (a)
= P
(
X`u(t) ≥ 1
) ≤ x`u(t)
(b)
=
(βt)`u
`u!
(c)
=
(
1 +
√
`u
)−`u(`u
e
)`u 1
`u!
(d)
<
(
1 +
√
`u
)−`u 1√
2pi`u
(e)
< e−
√
`u .
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Equality (a) follows from the fact that X`u is an integer. The second equality (b) follows from equation (6).
Equality (c) is obtained by substitution βt using equation (7). Inequality (d) uses Stirling’s approximation.
Inequality (e) holds since
(
1 + 1√
x
)x
> e
√
x−1/2 for all x > 1.
Let 1 = √`u , then we have
P
(
D(t) < (1 + 1)eβt
)
= P
(
X`u(t) = 0
)
> 1− e−
√
`u = 1− e−1`u > 1− e−1eβt, (8)
which gives us RNaS ≤ e.
Similar, for small  > 0, let `l := (1− )eβt, then
x`l(t) =
(βt)
`l
`l!
≥ 1
e
(eβt
`l
)`l = 1
e
( 1
1− 
)(1−)eβt →∞
as t→∞, which gives us RNaS ≥ e and concludes the proof.
A.2 Rg calculation according to [11]
We recall that Rg(1− β) is the expected growth rate of the longest chain of the tree grown by honest nodes
(adversaries are acting purely privately) using the g-greedy protocol. We also recall that Rg is increasing
monotonically in g and that R∞ = e, where e is the base of the natural logarithm. In [11], the authors claim
that R2 = 2.1 by assuming that all chains grow with at the same steady rate as the longest chain and then
investigating the average case. One can generalize their methodology for arbitrary g as follows: suppose the
length of the longest chain at round r is `, let xi with 0 ≤ i ≤ g be the number of chains with length `− i.
For simplicity, x0 is set to be 1. Then using the arguments in Lemma 4.6 in [11], we obtain the following
g + 1 equations with g + 1 unknowns {xi : 1 ≤ i ≤ g} and Rg.
x0+x1
2 = Rgx0
xi+xi+1
2 = Rg(xi − xi−1) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , g − 1}
xg = Rg(xg − xg−1)
By solving these equations numerically, we obtain the value of Rg as shown in Table 4. It turns out that
Rg > e for g ≥ 8 which is in contradiction to the fact that Rg is monotonically increasing and the limiting
value is R∞ = e. This shows that the method in [11] to estimate the growth rate of the longest chain is
flawed.
g 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ∞
Rg 1 1.7071 2.1072 2.3428 2.4905 2.5883 2.6562 2.7051 2.7414 2.7690 2.7906 e = 2.7183
Table 4: Chain growth rate for g-greedy protocol using the method of [11]. There is an inconsistency in the calculation
for g ≥ 8.
A.3 Pseudo Code for the Balance Attack on g-greedy Protocol
In the main text we have described the balance attack informally along with accompanying examples depicted
in Figure 3. Here we provide a formal pseudocode describing the balance attack algorithm for completeness.
A.4 Growth rate of 1-distance-greedy Protocol
In this section we calculate the expected growth rate of honest tree under 1-distance-greedy protocol with a
continuous time Markov chain.
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Balance attack (g)
1: procedure Initialize( )
2: PrivateTree1← genesis
3: PrivateTree2← genesis
4: PublicTree1← genesis
5: PublicTree2← genesis
6: procedure Attack( )
7: for r = 1 : rmax do
8: HonestMining(g,PublicTree1,PublicTree2) . honest nodes work on blocks in the public view
under g-greedy protocol
9: AdversaryMining(PrivateTree1,PrivateTree2) . adversary works privately on all blocks in the
private view
10: if height(PublicTree1) == height(PublicTree2) then
11: adversary reveals nothing
12: else if height(PublicTree1) > height(PublicTree2) then
13: PublicTree2(1:height(PublicTree1)) ← PrivateTree2(1:height(PublicTree1))
14: else if height(PublicTree1) < height(PublicTree2) then
15: PublicTree1(1:height(PublicTree2)) ← PrivateTree1(1:height(PublicTree2))
16: height(r) ← max{height(PublicTree1),height(PublicTree2)}
17: diff(r) ← height(PublicTree1) − height(PublicTree2)
18: return height(last(diff == 0)) . return the length of the longest fork from genesis
The honest nodes grow a tree starting with the genesis block as root at time t = 0. At any time t, the
honest nodes independently mines on a set of blocks according to 1-distance-greedy protocol. From the point
of view of a fixed block, its child-blocks are generated as a Poisson point process with rate 1 − β i.e., the
time interval between the child-blocks is an exponential random variable with rate 1− β.
Let W (t) be the number of blocks on the tip of the tree. For very small values of h, we have
P
(
W (t+ h) = k + 1 |W (t) = k) = (1− β)h+ o(h)
P
(
W (t+ h) = 1 |W (t) = k) = k(1− β)h+ o(h)
It follows that the infinitesimal generator of W (t) is
A = (1− β)

−1 1 0 0 · · ·
2 −3 1 0 · · ·
3 0 − 4 1 · · ·
...
...
...
...
. . .

let pi = (pi1, pi2, · · · ) be the stationary distribution, then it satisfies piA = 0. By solving the equations, we
have pi1 = 12(e−2) and pin =
2pi1
(n+1)! for n ≥ 1. Then the expected number of blocks on the tip of the honest
tree can be computed as
E[W (t)] =
∞∑
n=1
npin = 2pi1
∞∑
n=1
n
(n+ 1)!
= 2pi1
∞∑
n=1
( 1
n!
− 1
(n+ 1)!
)
= 2pi1 =
1
e− 2 .
Let T be the time for the height of the honest tree to grow by one, then we have
P(T ∈ (t, t+ dt) |W (t) = k, T ≥ t) = k(1− β)dt
=⇒P(T ∈ (t, t+ dt) | T ≥ t) =
∞∑
k=1
k(1− β)dtP(W (t) = k) = E[W (t)](1− β)dt
=⇒P(T ∈ (t, t+ dt))
P(T ≥ t) = E[W (t)](1− β)dt. (9)
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Let fT (t) be the probability density function of random variable T , FT (t) be the cumulative distribution
function of T , and F cT (t) = 1− FT (t), then we know fT (t) = − ˙F cT (t). Equation (9) can be represented as
˙F cT (t)
F cT (t)
= −E[W (t)](1− β)dt,
with F cT (0) = 1, and the solution of this differential equation is F
c
T (t) = e
E[W (t)](1−β), then we have
E[T ] =
∫ ∞
0
F cT (t)dt =
1
E[W (t)](1− β) .
Therefore we can conclude that the growth rate of the honest tree A1(1− β) = 1/E[T ] = E[W (t)](1− β) =
1−β
e−2 ≈ 1.39(1− β).
A.5 Growth rate of 1-distance-greedy Protocol under Balance Attack
In this section we calculate the expected growth rate of honest tree in 1-distance-greedy protocol under the
balance attack in Section 2.2 (see pseudocode in Appendix A.6).
We start with two chains of equal length and the distance between them is greater than 1. In this situation,
honest nodes will split into two groups with equal stake proportion to mine on different chains under 1-
distance-greedy protocol. We first consider the steady state behavior where the adversary has “sufficient"
number of private chains under each public chain, that is, whenever the length of one public chain grows by
one, the adversary can immediately reveal one block for the other chain to re-balance these two chains and
keep the honest nodes split. We analyze the transient stage, i.e., getting to steady state from genesis after
the steady state analysis.
Let U(t) and V (t) be the number of blocks on the tip of the two trees. For very small values of h, we
have
P
(
(U(t+ h), V (t+ h)) = (u+ 1, v) | (U(t), V (t)) = (u, v)) = 0.5(1− β)h+ o(h)
P
(
(U(t+ h), V (t+ h)) = (u, v + 1) | (U(t), V (t)) = (u, v)) = 0.5(1− β)h+ o(h)
P
(
(U(t+ h), V (t+ h)) = (1, 1) | (U(t), V (t)) = (u, v)) = 0.5(u+ v)(1− β)h+ o(h)
Let Z(t) = U(t) + V (t), then we have
P
(
Z(t+ h) = k + 1 | Z(t) = k) = (1− β)h+ o(h)
P
(
Z(t+ h) = 2 | Z(t) = k) = 0.5k(1− β)h+ o(h)
It follows that the infinitesimal generator of Z(t) is
A = (1− β)

−1 1 0 0 · · ·
1.5 −2.5 1 0 · · ·
2 0 − 3 1 · · ·
...
...
...
...
. . .

let pi = (pi2, pi3, · · · ) be the stationary distribution, then it satisfies piA = 0. By solving the equations, we
have pi2 = 23e2−19 and pin =
3pi12
n+1
(n+2)! for n ≥ 1. Then the expected number of blocks on the tip of the honest
tree can be computed as
E[Z(t)] =
∞∑
n=2
npin = 3pi2
∞∑
n=2
2n+1n
(n+ 2)!
= 3pi2
∞∑
n=2
2n+1(n+ 2− 2)
(n+ 2)!
= 3pi2
∞∑
n=2
( 2n+1
(n+ 1)!
− 2
n+2
(n+ 2)!
)
= 4pi2.
Let T be the time for the height of the honest tree to grow by one. Then, similar to the analysis in
Appendix A.4, we have that E[T ] = 2/(E[Z(t)](1− β)) Thus the growth rate of the honest tree A˜1(1− β) =
1/E[T ] = E[Z(t)](1− β)/2 = 4e2−19 (1− β) ≈ 1.26(1− β) < A1(1− β).
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This implies that the growth rate of the public longest chain will be slowed down due to the balance
attack. Therefore, when the adversary with β smaller but close to A1/(A1+ e) succeeds in balancing the two
chains for some time, the private chains will grow faster than the public chain, which gives the adversary a
lot of future blocks in the “bank” to continue the balance attack.
A.6 Pseudo Code for the Balance Attack on 1-distance-greedy Protocol
Here we provide a formal pseudocode describing the balance attack algorithm on 1-distance-greedy protocol
for completeness.
Balance attack (D = 1, β)
1: procedure Initialize( )
2: PrivateTree1← genesis
3: PrivateTree2← genesis
4: PublicTree1← genesis
5: PublicTree2← genesis
6: procedure Attack( )
7: for r = 1 : rmax do
8: if height(PublicTree1) == height(PublicTree2) then
9: HonestMining(Poisson_rate = 0.5(1− β), D = 1,PublicTree1,PublicTree2)
10: else if height(PublicTree1) > height(PublicTree2) then
11: HonestMining(Poisson_rate = 1− β, D = 1,PublicTree1)
12: else if height(PublicTree1) < height(PublicTree2) then
13: HonestMining(Poisson_rate = 1− β, D = 1,PublicTree2)
. honest nodes work on blocks in the public view under D-distance-greedy protocol
14: AdversaryMining(Poisson_rate = β,PrivateTree1,PrivateTree2) . adversary works privately on
all blocks in the private view
15: if height(PublicTree1) == height(PublicTree2) then
16: adversary reveals nothing
17: else if height(PublicTree1) > height(PublicTree2) then
18: PublicTree2(height(PublicTree2)+1:min(height(PrivateTree2),height(PublicTree1)) ← 1 .
adversary reveals a chain from PrivateTree2 to match the height of the public trees if he can
19: else if height(PublicTree1) < height(PublicTree2) then
20: PublicTree1(height(PublicTree1)+1:min(height(PrivateTree1),height(PublicTree2)) ← 1 .
adversary reveals a chain from PrivateTree1 to match the height of the public trees if he can
21: height(r) ← max{height(PublicTree1),height(PublicTree2)}
22: diff(r) ← height(PublicTree1) − height(PublicTree2)
23: return height(last(diff == 0)) . return the length of the longest fork from genesis
B Proofs for Section 6
We provide proofs of technical results.
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We provide proofs of each of the three properties.
Common prefix Given Corollary 1, it suffices to prove that under the (ε, λ)-typical execution, the κ-
common prefix holds, where κ = 2φcf∆λ. Consider the discrete model where the honest users successfully
generate Poi((1 − β)f∆) blocks in a time slot and the adversary has a probability of successfully mining
Poi(βf∆).
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Lemma 2. Suppose the block b at height k of a chain C was generated by an honest node in round r. Then
any block at height k on any chain C′ at any time is either block b, one of the other blocks generated by some
honest node in round r, or is generated by the adversary.
Proof. We show this by contradiction.
Let Br be the set of honest blocks computed in round r, and Bs be the set of honest blocks computed in
round s, where s > r.
Let one of Br be the k-th block in chain C. We have that each block in Br is in the k-th position in some
chain, because no honest miners would be mining at chains which were at depth k − 2.
For obtaining a contradiction assume that one of the blocks of Bs is at the k-th position of some chain
C′.
We note that round r + 1 on-wards, all honest miners mine at position at least k in any chain. This
contradicts the claim that some honest miner was mining at level k − 1 in some chain at round s ≥ r + 1,
giving us the result.
Remark 1. We note that the this remark implies that we have an injection between honest blocks mined in
uniquely successful rounds which are not on chain C to adversarial blocks on chain C.
Similarly for a chain C, recall that ZC [S] is defined to be the number of different rounds in which adversary
mines blocks on chain C. Let us focus on the block tree at round r, and the longest chain at that round r on
the honest view (if there are multiple longest chains pick any one of them arbitrarily). Define the following
events, with r′ = r − λ, where λ = κ2φcf∆ .
E˜1[r
′, r] =
⋂
0≤r˜≤r′
⋂
C
diverges from
longest chain
at r˜
{
1
2
Y [r˜, r]− ZC [r˜, r] > 0
}
E2[r
′, r] =
⋂
C
diverges from
longest chain
at r′
{X[r′, r] + ZC [r′, r] < κ}
E˜[r′, r] = E˜1[r′, r] ∩ E2[r′, r].
Lemma 3. Under the (ε, λ)-typical execution under a β-corrupt system with f∆ ≤ ε/2, and β <(
1−ε
1+2(1+2ε)φc
)
, the event E˜ occurs for all r and r′ = r − κ/(2φcf∆).
Proof. We note that typical execution implies concentration of V [S] and hence concentration on all chains
of C diverging from S. We further have concentration of Y [S] and X[S].
On the expected values, note that E[Y [S]] = (1−β)f∆|S|e−(1−β)f∆, then we have Y [S] ≥ (1−ε)E[Y [S]] =
(1 − ε)(1 − β)f∆|S|e−(1−β)f∆ > (1 − ε)(1 − β)f∆|S|e−f∆. By definition, we have ZC [S] ≤ V [S] ≤ (1 +
ε)φcβf∆|S|. The first condition gives us that
β <
1− ε
1 + 2(1 + 2ε)φc
,
=⇒ 1
2
(1− ε)(1− β)f∆|S|e−f∆ > (1 + ε)φcβf∆|S|,
=⇒ 1
2
Y [S] > V [S] ≥ ZC [S] ,
where we assumed f∆ ≤ ε/2, which gives us the occurrence of event E˜1. On the other hand, we have
concentration of X[S] and ZC [S]. For S = [r − λ, r], we have
X[r − λ, r] ≤ (1 + ε)EX[S] < (1 + ε)(1− β)f∆λ,
ZC [r − λ, r] ≤ (1 + ε)φcβf∆λ,
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thus X[r− λ, r] +ZC [r− λ, r] < (1 + ε)(1− β + φcβ)f∆λ < 2(1− β + φcβ)f∆λ < 2φcf∆λ = κ, which gives
the claim.
Lemma 4. If E˜[r′, r] occurs with r′ = r − λ = r − κ2φcf∆ , the last κ consecutive blocks of any chain C at
round r are mined in at least λ consecutive rounds.
Proof. By definition we know that E2[r′, r] ⊇ E˜[r′, r]. Event E2[r′, r] implies that the total number of blocks
of any chain C mined in interval [r′, r] is less than κ. Therefore the κ-th deep block of C was mined on or
before round r′.
Theorem 3. If E˜[r′, r] occurs with r′ = r − κ2φcf∆ for all r, the κ-common prefix property holds.
> λ rounds 𝑟$ 𝑟 − 1		 𝑟		 𝑟( 		
Last common
block
𝒞(# 𝒞(
𝒞$ 𝒞$#Last common honest block𝑏∗, mined at round 𝑟∗
(could be genesis)
> 	blocks
Interval 𝑆
𝑟∗
κ
Fig. 11: Round r is the first round that the κ-deep prefix of the longest chain is changed.
Proof. Let C1 be a chain which is the longest chain at current round r1 and C2 be a chain which is the longest
chain at a future round r2 > r1, which violates the common-prefix property, i.e., Cdκ1 6 C2.
Let r be the earliest round r1 ≤ r ≤ r2 such that there is a longest chain C′2 such that Cdκ1 6 C′2. If r = r1,
define C′1 = C1; otherwise, define C′1 to be a longest chain at round r − 1. Note that Cdκ1  C′1.
Observe that by our assumptions such an r is well-defined (since e.g., r2 is such a round, albeit not
necessarily the smallest one); refer to Figure 11 for an illustration. Consider the last block b∗ on the common
prefix of C′1 and C′2 that was mined by an honest node and let r∗ be the round in which it was mined (if no
such block exists let r∗ = 0).
Define the set of rounds S = {i : r∗ < i ≤ r}.
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Let Yo[S] be the number of blocks generated in the interval S which are neither in C′1 or C′2 by honest
blocks in uniquely successful rounds. Using Lemma 2, we claim that,
Yo[S] + YC′1 [S] ≤ ZC′2 [S],
Yo[S] + YC′2 [S] ≤ ZC′1 [S],
We note that as at least one of Yo[S] + YC′1 [S] and Yo[S] + Y
′
C2 [S] has to be at least
1
2Y [S], we have that
1
2
Y [S] ≤ max (ZC′1 [S], ZC′2 [S])
However, we note that, E˜[r1 − λ, r1] holding gives us E2[r1 − λ, r1] holds, from Lemma 4, which gives us
that, the κ-th deep block of the chain C1 was mined on or before round r1−λ and this implies r∗ < r1−λ ≤
r − λ. Then we have E˜1[r − λ, r] which gives us the a contradiction and hence the claim.
Chain quality We show this by contradiction. Let C be the longest chain of an honest node at round r
and denote the i-th block of chain C as bi so that C = [b1, b2, · · · , blen(C)]. Consider any κ consecutive blocks
in chain C denoted by C[u, v] := [bu, · · · , bv]. Then let N ≥ κ to be the smallest number s.t. N consecutive
blocks C[u′, v′] = [bu′ , · · · , bv′ ] include C[u, v] and have the properties: (1) that the block bu′ was mined by
an honest node or is genesis in case such block does not exist, and (2) that there exists a round at which an
honest node was trying to extend the chain ending at block bv′ . Note that C[u′, v′] is well defined since C is
such a chain. Define r1 as the round that block bu′ was mined (r1 = 0 if bu′ is the genesis block), r2 as the
first round that an honest node attempts to extend bv′ .
Define the set of rounds S = {i : r1 < i ≤ r2}. Let H be the number of honest blocks on chain C
mined in the interval S and say H < µκ. Then the number of blocks on chain C mined by adversary in
the same interval S is at least N − 1−H, i.e., ZC [r1, r2] ≥ N − 1−H. By chain growth property, we have
N − 1 ≥ X[r1, r2]. Adding them up, we have
ZC [r1, r2] > X[r1, r2]− µκ. (10)
We note that, E˜[r2 − λ, r2] holding gives us E2[r2 − λ, r2] holds, from Lemma 4, which gives us that bu,
was mined on or before round r2 − λ. Since block bu′ was mined before block bu, we have r1 ≤ r2 − λ. Then
under the event E1[r2 − λ, r2], we have
1
2
Y [r1, r2]− ZC [r1, r2] > 0
Since X[r1, r2] ≥ Y [r1, r2], we obtain
X[r1, r2]− ZC [r1, r2] > 1
2
Y [r1, r2]
≥ 1
2
(1− ε)E[Y [S]]
=
1
2
(1− ε)(1− β)f∆|S|e−(1−β)f∆
≥ 1
2
(1− ε)(1− β)f∆λe−f∆
≥ (1− 2ε)(1− β)
4φc
κ,
which contradicts Equation (10) for µ = (1−2ε)(1−β)4φc . Therefore, in the interval S, at least µκ blocks on
C[bu′ , bv′ ] were mined by honest nodes and these blocks must be in C[u, v] by definition of N .
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Chain growth Since honest nodes always work on the longest chain in the unique honest view, the length
of the longest chain grows by at least X[r − λ, r] in the interval [r − λ, r]. And we have
X[r − λ, r] ≥ (1− ε)E[X[r − λ, r]] ≥ (1− ε)E[Y [r − λ, r]] > (1− 2ε)(1− β)f∆λ,
which completes the proof.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The adversary is growing a private chain over the genesis block, under the c-correlation. As illustrated in the
figure below, the common source of randomness at a block is only updated when the height is a multiple of
c (Algorithm 1 line:19). We refer to such a block b with height(b)%c = 0 as a godfather-block.
RandSource(b) :=
{
VRFprove
(
RandSource(parent(b)), time,VRF.sk(b)
)
, if height
(
b
)
%c = 0,
RandSource(parent(b)), otherwise
The randomness of a block changes only at godfather-blocks. In other words, for n ∈ Z, blocks along a chain
at depths
{
nc, nc+1, nc+2, · · · , nc+c−1} share a common random number. Two blocks are called siblings-
blocks if they have the same parent block. Given this shared randomness, the adversary now has a freedom
to choose where to place the newly generated blocks. The next theorem provides a dominant strategy, that
creates the fastest growing private tree.
Lemma 5. Under c-correlation, the optimal adversarial strategy to grow the tree fast is to only fork at the
parents of godfather-blocks.
Proof. Note that under the security model, several types of grinding attacks are plausible. First, at height
multiple of c, the adversary can grind on the header of the parent of the godfather block, and run an
independent election at every round. Secondly, between godfather blocks, once an adversary is elected a
leader, it can generate multiple blocks of the same header but appending on different blocks. However,
adding multiple blocks with the same header cannot make the tree any higher than the optimal scheme.
Genesis
height=5
height=10
height=0
Fig. 12: An example of T (∆)(t) with c = 5 under the optimal strategy to grow the private NaS tree. Blocks forking
from the same godfather-block share the same common source of randomness, as shown by the colors. To grow the
tree fast, it is optimal to grow a single chain until the next godfather block. Circles with black outlines indicate blocks
that are currently mined on.
Sibling non-godfather blocks share a common random number and thus ‘mining events’ on these blocks
are completely dependent. As a result, the longest chain originating from a particular non-godfather block b
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is always longer (or same length) than the longest chain originating from its younger sibling (a sibling block
mined after block b). Thus mining a sibling to a non-godfather block does not increase the growth rate of
the longest chain. However, sibling god-father blocks have independent random numbers and thus mining
multiple such block increase the growth rate of the longest chain.
From the point of view of a fixed block that is currently being mined on, its child-blocks are generated
as a Poisson point process with rate βf∆. Let the number of blocks at height ` at time t ∈ {∆, 2∆, · · · } be
X`(t), and the expectation is x`(t) = E[X`(t)]. The genesis block is at heights zero. Let T (∆)(t) denote the
resulting random tree, and height(T (∆)(t)) denote the height of the tree.
Note that lim∆→0 T (∆)(t) converges to a continuous time process, where the block tree is growing with
Poisson arrival rate of βf . We denote this by T (0)(t). Every block in current tree produces a child node
arriving at rate βf according to a Poisson arrival process. This continuous time process dominates the
discrete time process in the sense that Pr(T (∆)(t) ≥ h) ≤ Pr(T (0)(t) ≥ h) for all ∆ > 0, h > 0 and t > 0. As
the growth of the height of the random tree is of our interest, we focus on the continuous time process in
this section, and naturally extend the definitions of X`(t) and x`(t) to the continuous time counterparts.
We will first derive differential equations for x`(t). Since the adversary only mines multiple godfather
sibling blocks, the growth rate of blocks at level i = nc + l (for m, l ∈ Z, l < c) depends on i%c = l. In
particular we have
dxnc+l(t)
dt
=
{
βxnc+l−1(t) for l = 0
β
(
xnc+l−1(t)− xnc+l(t)
)
for l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , c− 1} (11)
with initial condition xnc+l = Xnc+l(0) = 0 and the root block satisfying
x0(t) = E
[
X0(t)
]
=
{
1 t ≥ 0
0 t < 0
.
We solve for xnc+l(t) via Laplace transform. We first transform the differential equations (11) in Laplace
domain, obtain a closed form solution for xˆnc+l(s). After that we transform the equations back to time
domain.
First lets apply Laplace transform for the above system of equations (11).
sxˆnc+l(s) =
{
βxˆnc+l−1(s) for l = 0
β
(
xˆnc+l−1(s)− xˆnc+l(s)
)
for l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , c− 1}
Solving the above system of equations gives us
xˆnc(s) =
βn
sn+1(1 + s/β)(c−1)n
.
Let us substitute β = 1 for simplicity. We compute the inverse Laplace transform of xˆnc(s) via convolution:
xˆnc(s) =
( 1
sn+1
)( 1
(1 + s)(c−1)n
)
xnc(t) = L−1
{ 1
sn+1
}
~ L−1
{ 1
(1 + s)(c−1)n
}
=
( 1
n!
tn
)
~
( 1
((c− 1)n− 1)!e
−tt(c−1)n−1
)
=
1
n!((c− 1)n− 1)!
∫ t
0
eu−t(t− u)(c−1)n−1undu
=
e−t
(cn)!
∫ t
0
eu
(cn)!
n!((c− 1)n− 1)! (t− u)
(c−1)n−1undu
(a)
=
e−t
(cn)!
tcn
∫ 1
0
etz
(cn)!
n!((c− 1)n− 1)! (1− z)
(c−1)n−1zndz
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=
e−t
(cn)!
tcnE
[
etZ
]
, where Z ∈ Beta(n+ 1, (c− 1)n)
=
e−t
(cn)!
tcnMGFbeta(n+1,(c−1)n)(t) (12)
The equality (a) is obtained by change of variable u = tz. Our goal is to find the largest θ for which xnc(θn)
decreases exponentially w.r.t n. Thus we evaluate the MGFbeta(n+1,(c−1)n)(t) at t = θn:
MGFbeta(α,β)(t) = 1 +
∞∑
p=1
p−1∏
r=0
( α+ r
α+ β + r
) tp
p!
MGFbeta(n+1,(c−1)n)(t) = 1 +
∞∑
p=1
p−1∏
r=0
( n+ r + 1
cn+ r + 1
) tp
p!
MGFbeta(n+1,(c−1)n)(θn) = 1 +
∞∑
p=1
p−1∏
r=0
( n+ r + 1
cn+ r + 1
) (θn)p
p!
≤ 1 +
2eθn∑
p=1
p−1∏
r=0
( n+ r + 1
cn+ r + 1
) (θn)p
p!
+
∞∑
p=2eθn
p−1∏
r=0
( n+ r + 1
cn+ r + 1
) (θn)p
p!
(a)
≤ 1 +
2eθn∑
p=1
p−1∏
r=0
( n+ r + 1
cn+ r + 1
) (θn)p
p!
+
∞∑
p=2eθn
(θn)p
p!
≤ 1 +
2eθn∑
p=1
p−1∏
r=0
( n+ r + 1
cn+ r + 1
) (θn)p
p!
+
∞∑
p=2eθn
1
2
p
≤ 2 +
2eθn∑
p=1
p−1∏
r=0
( n+ r + 1
cn+ r + 1
) (θn)p
p!
(13)
The summation in Equation (13) is dominated by its largest term, which is given by
np0−1∏
r=0
( n+ r + 1
cn+ r + 1
) (θn)np0
np0!
(14)
where p0 satisfies
(1 + p0)
(c+ p0)
θ
p0
= 1 (15)
=⇒p0 = θ − c+
√
(θ − c)2 + 4θ
2
, (16)
Let φc = c/θ and ψc = p0/c, then Eq. (16) gives Eq. (2). Substituting Eq. (13) in Eq. (12), we get
xnc
(nc
φc
) ≤ e− ncφc
(cn)!
(nc
φc
)cn(
2 + (
2ecn
φc
)
(n+ ncψc)!(cn)!
n!(cn+ ncψc)!
(
nc
φc
)ncψc
(ncψc)!
)
= (
2ecn
φc
)e−
nc
φc
(nc
φc
)cn (n+ ncψc)!
n!(cn+ ncψc)!
(
nc
φc
)ncψc
(ncψc)!
+ 2
e−
nc
φc
(cn)!
(nc
φc
)cn
≤ (2ecn
φc
)e−
nc
φc
(nc
φc
)cn e(√n+ ncψc)(n+ncψce )n+ncψc√
2pin(ne )
n
√
2pi(cn+ ncψc)(
cn+ncψc
e )
cn+ncψc
(
nc
φc
)ncψc
√
2pincψc(
ncψc
e )
ncψc
+ 2
e−
nc
φc√
2picn(nce )
nc
(nc
φc
)cn
=
e2
φcpi
√
1 + cψc
2pi(1 + ψc)ψc
e−
nc
φc
+cn+ncψc
( c
φc(c+ cψc)
)cn+ncψc(
1 +
1
cψc
)ncψc
(1 + cψc)
n + 2
e−
nc
φc√
2picn
( e
φc
)cn
Proof-of-Stake Longest Chain Protocols Revisited 33
=
e2
φcpi
√
1 + cψc
2pi(1 + ψc)ψc
e
nc
(
− 1φc+1+ψc+(1+ψc) ln
(
1
φc(1+ψc)
)
+ 1c ln(1+cψc)+ψc ln
(
1+ 1cψc
))
+ 2
e−
nc
φc√
2picn
( e
φc
)cn
=
e2
φcpi
√
1 + cψc
2pi(1 + ψc)ψc
+
√
2
picn
e−nc(
1
φc
−1+ln(φc))
=
e2
pi
√
c
2piφc
+
√
2
picn
e−nc(
1
φc
−1+ln(φc)) (17)
The fixed point pair (φc, ψc) is the threshold above which the expected number of blocks at that level
h = cn = tφc at time t = cn/φc starts to decrease exponentially. Note that we always have 1φc −1+ln(φc) > 0
since φc > 1. Notice that
xnc
(nc
φ
)
≤ exp{ncFc(φ) +On(1)} ,
where Fc(φ) := Fc(φ, ψ), and Fc(φ, ψ) is defined in Eq. (1), and we plug-in ψ = ψ(φ) =
(c− cφ+√(c− cφ)2 + 4cφ)/2cφ satisfying Eq. (2). Next we show that the gradient of the exponent is
strictly negative:
dFc(φ)
dφ
=
1
φ2
− 1 + ψ(φ)
φ
+
dψ(φ)
dφ
dFc(φ, ψ)
dψ
=
1− φ−
√
(1− φ)2 + 4φc
2φ2
< 0 , (18)
for all 0 < c <∞ and φ > 0, where we used the fact that dψ(φ)/dφ = 0 as ψ(φ) is the maximizer of Eq. (13).
Precisely, dFc(φ, ψ)/dψ = ln((1 + cψ)/(c(1 + ψ)ψφ)). This is zero, which follows from Eq. (15). It follows
that
xnc
( nc
φc(1 + ε)
)
≤ exp
{
ncε
dFc(φc)
dφ
+On(1) +Oε(nε
2)
}
, (19)
where we used the fact that Fc(φc) = 0 from the definition of φc. After re-scaling the time to take into
account f∆β blocks are generated per second (and letting nc = φcr), we get the desired result for any
c = Θ(1). If c increases, the derivative in (18) approaches zero. A tighter analysis in this asymptotic regime
is provided in Proposition 2 and in Appendix B.3.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Let φc = 1 + εc, and suppose εc = oc(1) and ψc = oc(1) as c grows. From Eq. (1), Taylor expansion gives
Fc(φc, ψc) = −1
2
ε2c − ψcεc −
1
2
ψ2c +
1
c
ln(1 + cψc) + ψc ln(1 +
1
cψc
) + oc(ε
2
c + ψ
2
c ) . (20)
From Eq. (2), we know that ψc = O(max{1/(cεc),
√
c}). Hence, in order for the dominating terms to cancel,
we need (1/2)ε2c > (1/c) ln(1+cφc). When ε =
√
(ln c)/c+o(
√
(ln c)/c) and the corresponding ψc = O(1/
√
c),
then this can be satisfied for large enough c. In this case, we get that Fc(φc, ψc) = −Ω(
√
ln c/c).
B.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Consider the block-tree at any round in operation. Note that this block tree depends upon both the honest
operating protocol which we have defined above and adversarial strategy, which can be arbitrary.
Let Tr be a block tree defined according to the PoS protocol conditioned on the adversarial strategy.
Let C be a longest chain on Tr.
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Define
Ar˜ = {C′ ∈ Tr|C′ diverged from C at round r˜}
We note that in rounds [r˜, r], by Lemma 1, the growth of chains inAr˜ would be at most φcβf∆(r−r˜)(1+1)
with probability at least 1− e−1φcβf∆(r−r˜) if it were just an adversarial process. However, considering the
presence of honest nodes, we have that in rounds [r˜, r], there are at most 100(1− β)f∆(r − r˜) ≤ 100(r − r˜)
honest blocks generated with probability at least 1−e−100(1−β)∆f(r−r˜) by Chernoff bound for Poisson random
variable.
Let B0 be the last block mined by honest nodes in rounds [r˜, r], which is at height k0 and mined at round
r0. By definition, all descendant blocks of B0 are mined by adversarial nodes. If we contract the edge between
B0 and its parent block and move block B0 right under the genesis block, then V [r˜, r] will not decrease and
adversarial nodes can mine more blocks in rounds [r˜, r0]. Repeat this operation for all honest nodes mined
in rounds [r˜, r], we have that V [r˜, r] is upper bounded by the scenario where all 100(r− r˜) honest blocks are
right under the genesis block although this scenario violates rules for honest nodes.
Hence we have that the probability of a chain in Ar˜ having added more than φcβf∆(r − r˜)(1 + 1)
in-sequence adversarial blocks in [r˜, r] is at most 100(r− r˜)e−1φcβf∆(r−r˜)+e−100(1−β)∆f(r−r˜) for any 1 > 0.
In other words, with probability, 1-(r− r˜)e−Ω(1φcβf∆(r−r˜)), we have that V [r˜, r] ≤ φcβf∆(r− r˜)(1+ 1) for
a given r˜.
Next we compute the probability that for all rˆ < r − k2φcf∆ , V [rˆ, r] ≤ φcβf∆(r − rˆ)(1 + 1). We do this
by a union bound noting that, the probability of failure is upper bounded by
r− k2φcf∆∑
rˆ=0
(r − rˆ)e−Ω(1φcf∆β(r−rˆ)) ≤
∞∑
`= k2φcf∆
`e−Ω(1φcf∆β`),
= e−Ω(1βk),
giving us that with probability 1− e−Ω(1βk), V [[r′, r]] ≤ (1 + 1)φcβf∆(r − r′) for all r′ < r − k2φcf∆ .
B.5 Proof of Theorem 4
Definition 7 (from [12]). A protocol Π maintains a robust public transaction ledger if it organizes the
ledger as a blockchain of transactions and it satisfies the following two properties:
– (Persistence) Parameterized by κ ∈ N, if in a certain round a transaction tx appears in a block which
is more than κ blocks away from the end of the main chain of an honest node (such transaction will be
called confirmed), then tx will be confirmed by all honest nodes in the same position in the ledger.
– (Liveness) Parameterized by u, κ ∈ N, if a transaction tx is received by all honest nodes for more than u
rounds, then all honest nodes will report tx at least κ blocks away from the end of the ledger, i.e., tx will
be confirmed by all honest nodes.
The main result is that common prefix, chain quality, and chain growth imply that the transaction ledger
satisfies persistence and liveness.
Theorem 4. Under Assumption 1, distributed nodes running Nakamoto-PoS protocol generates a transac-
tion ledger satisfying persistence and liveness in Definition 7 with probability at least 1− e−Ω(ε2κ).
Proof. We first prove Persistence. The proof is essentially based on the common prefix property of Nakamoto-
PoS protocol.
Lemma 6 (Persistence). The public transaction ledger maintained by Nakamoto-PoS satisfies Persistence
parameterized by κ with probability at least 1− e−Ω(ε2κ).
Proof. Let C1 be the main chain of an honest node P1 at round r1. Suppose a transaction tx is contained
in Cdκ1 at round r1, i.e., it is confirmed by P1. Consider a main chain C2 of an honest node P2 at a round
r2 ≥ r1. By the common prefix property, Cdκ1  C2, which completes the proof.
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We next prove Liveness, which is based on the chain quality and chain growth property of Nakamoto-PoS
protocol.
Lemma 7 (Liveness). The public transaction ledger maintained by Nakamoto-PoS satisfies Livenesss pa-
rameterized by u = d 2κ(1−β)(1−2ε)f∆e and κ with probability at least 1− e−Ω(ε
2κ).
Proof. We prove that after a transaction tx is received by all honest nodes for at least u rounds, then there
exists an honest node with chain C such that C is the longest chain and tx is included in Cdκ. By chain growth
property, the length of the main chain of any honest node has increased by at least 2κ blocks in consecutive
u rounds.
Then the chain quality property implies that at least one of the blocks in the κ suffix of Cdκ was mined
by an honest node. Such a block would contain tx since all honest nodes have received tx as an unconfirmed
transaction at that time. Thus, the lemma follows.
B.6 Proof of Theorem 2
We first analysis s-truncation protocol under static stake setting. With static stake setting, the adversary is
not able to grind on any coin in public or in private, so Proposition 4 still holds.
Then let r be the first time slot when one of the honest nodes (denoted as P ) would make different
decisions about what chain to work on based on s-truncation protocol and longest chain (LC) protocol. In
other words, all honest nodes equivalently follow LC protocol before time slot r. Let the fork observed by
P at time slot r be chain Ca and Cb, which belong to two subtrees Ta and Tb respectively with last common
block bfork mined at time slot rfork. Without loss of generality, assume that in the public view at time slot
r, Ca is longer than Cb while Cb is denser in the first s blocks after bfork, illustrated in Fig. 13.
Fig. 13: Round r is the first round that the s-truncation protocol is applied by an honest node.
Let the s-th block after bfork on chain Cb be b1 with height `1 mined at time slot r1. Note that at time
slot r1, some of the blocks up to b1 on chain Cb may be private but they will become public before time slot
r. Notice that the length of chain Ca at time slot r1 must be less than or equal to `1, otherwise it makes Ca
denser than Cb then Cb won’t be chosen at time slot r according to our s-truncation protocol. Let r2 be the
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first time slot after r1 such that chain Ca becomes the main chain according to LC protocol. Note that r2 is
well defined since r is such a time slot.
Let the public main chain at time slot r1 be C∗ with length `∗. Case(i): `∗ ≤ `1, then at some later time
slot when length of the main chain grows to `1, it must belong to Tb, otherwise the fork will be longer than
κ blocks if the adversary makes chain Cb public. Then at time slot r2, κ common prefix property of LC
protocol will be violated. Case(ii): `∗ > `1, then C∗ must belong to Ta, otherwise C∗ forks from Ca before
or at block bfork, which would violate the κ common prefix property of LC protocol at time slot r2. Since
honest nodes follow LC protocol in the interval [r1, r], only adversary will grow chain Ca before time slot
r2. One observation is that the length of Ca is dominated in distribution by the length of Cb in the interval
[r1, r2] since Ca is shorter than Cb at time slot r1, so if the adversary can grow Ca to be the main chain, Cb
will become even longer with a non-negligible probability, which violates κ common prefix property of LC
protocol
So far we have proved that with static setting, under typical execution, all honest nodes will actually
follow LC protocol regardless the adversarial behavior, therefore common prefix, chain growth, and chain
quality properties still hold for our s-truncation protocol with s = κ.
Next we consider the dynamic stake setting with s stake update rule. In order to grind on the secrete
key of a coin as discussed in §5, the adversary must control s consecutive blocks in the main chain. Note
that if the adversary starts grinding on some public adversarial blocks, that is the content of those blocks
are changed, then this kind of grinding attack is equivalent to privately mine consecutive s blocks since
those public adversarial blocks have already been received by honest nodes. However, the κ common prefix
property of LC protocol secures that the adversary cannot have a private chain denser than the main chain
in consecutive s blocks after the fork as we just proved. If the adversary grinds on a private chain sparser
than the main chain, the private chain won’t be accepted by honest nodes in our s-truncation protocol.
Finally, the only way for the adversary to grind on a coin is controlling the last s blocks in the main
chain. However this is also excluded under typical execution since chain quality gives us that there must be
at least one honest block in the last κ blocks of the main chain, which concludes the proof.
C Verifiable Random Functions
Definition 8 (from [9]). A function family F(·)(·) : {0, 1}a(κ) → {0, 1}b(κ) is a family of VRFs is there
exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm Gen and deterministic algorithms VRFprove and VR-
Fverify such that Gen(1κ) outputs a pair of keys (pk, sk); VRFprove(x, sk) computes (Fsk(x), pisk(x)),
where pisk(x) is the proof of correctness; and VRFverify(x, y, pi, pk) verifies that y = Fsk(x) using the proof
pi. Formally, we require
1. Uniqueness: no values (pk, x, y1, y2, pi1, pi2) can satisfy VRFverify(x, y1, pi1, pk) =VRFverify(x, y2, pi2, pk)
when y1 6= y2.
2. Provability: if (y, pi) =VRFprove(x, sk), then VRFverify(x, y, pi, sk) = 1.
3. Pseudorandomness: for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A = (A1, A2), who does not query
its oracle on x,
Pr
z = z
′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(pk, sk)← Gen(1κ);
(x, st)← AVRFprove(·)1 (pk);
y0 = Fsk(x);
y1 ← {0, 1}b(k);
z ← {0, 1};
z′ ← AVRFprove(·)2 (yz, st)
 ≤
1
2
+ negl(κ)
This ensures that the output of a VRF is computationally indistinguishable from a random number even
if the public key pk and the function VRFprove is revealed.
D Nakamoto-PoS Protocol Pseudocode
Proof-of-Stake Longest Chain Protocols Revisited 37
Algorithm 1 Nakamoto-PoS (c, s, δ)
1: procedure Initialize( )
2: BlkTree← genesis . Blocktree
3: parentBk ← genesis . Block to mine on
4: unCnfTx ← φ . Blk content: Pool of unconfirmed txs
5: procedure PosMining(coin)
6: while True do
7: SleepUntil(SystemTime % δ == 0) . System time is miner’s machine time
8: time ← SystemTime
9: (KES.vk,KES.sk),(VRF.pk,VRF.sk) ← coin.Keys()
10: // Update the stake according to the stake distribution in the s-th last block in the main chain.
11: stakeBk ← SearchChainUp(parentBk, s)
12: stake← coin.Stake(stakeBk)
13: ρ←UpdateGrowthRate(parentBk)
14: // Three sources of randomness: a common source (parentBk.content.RandSource), a private
source (coinSecretKey), and time.
15: header← 〈parentBk.content.RandSource , time〉
16: 〈hash,proof〉 ← VRFprove(header,VRF.sk) . Verifiable Random Function
17: if hash < ρ× stake then . Block generated
18: // Update common source of randomness every c-th block in a chain as per c-correlation
scheme
19: if parentBk.Height() % c == c− 1 then RandSource ← hash
20: else RandSource ← parentBk.content.RandSource
21: state ← Hash(parentBk)
22: content ← 〈 unCnfTx, coin, RandSource, hash, proof, state 〉 and break
// Return header along with signature on content
23: return 〈header, content,Sign(content,KES.sk)〉
24: // Function to listen messages and update the blocktree
25: procedure ReceiveMessage(X) . Receives messages from network
26: if X is a valid tx then
27: undfTx ← unCnfTx ∪ {X}
28: else if IsValidBlock(X) then
29: Xfork ← the highest block shared by the main chain and the chain leading to X
30: Lfork ← min(parentBk.Height(), X.Height()) - Xfork.Height()
31: if Lfork < s then . If the fork is less than s blocks
32: if parentBk.Height() < X.Height() then . If the new chain is longer
33: ChangeMainChain(X)
34: else . check s-truncated longest chain rule
35: MainChainBk ← SearchChainDown(parentBk, Xfork, s) . find the s-th block down the
main chain from fork
36: NewChainBk ← SearchChainDown(X, Xfork, s) . find the s-th block down the new chain
from fork
37: if NewChainBk.header.time < MainChainBk.header.time then . If the new chain is denser
38: ChangeMainChain(X)
39: procedure IsValidBlock(X) . returns true if a block is valid
40: if not IsUnspent(X.content.coin) then return False
41: if X.header.time > SystemTime then return False
42: if VRFverify(X.header, X.content.hash,X.content.proof,X.content.coin.VRF.pk) then
43: return True
44: else
45: return False
46: procedure Main( )
47: Initialize()
48: StartThread(ReceiveMessage)
49: while True do
50: block = PosMining(coin)
51: SendMessage(block) . Broadcast to the whole network
